Why do Kenyans vote along ethnic lines?  : A Study of Underlying Rationales for Kenyan Electoral Behaviour by Archer, Sigrid
 
 
Why do Kenyans vote along 
ethnic lines?  
 
 
A Study of Underlying Rationales 
 for Kenyan Electoral Behaviour 
(31,386 words) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Sigrid Archer  
 
 
 
Master Thesis  
Department of Political Science,  
University of Oslo  
June 2009
 
Table of contents 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS....................................................................................................................................... I 
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ...........................................................................................................III 
MAP OF KENYA................................................................................................................................................ IV 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS..................................................................................................................................V 
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 RESEARCH QUESTION .................................................................................................................................... 3 
1.2 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS ........................................................................................................................... 4 
CHAPTER 2 - BACKGROUND TO KENYA.................................................................................................... 6 
2.1 THE RUN-UP TO INDEPENDENCE .................................................................................................................... 6 
2.1.1 Developments in Central Province ....................................................................................................... 7 
2.1.2 Developments in the Rift Valley............................................................................................................ 8 
2.1.3 The Mau Mau ....................................................................................................................................... 8 
2.1.4 Settlement schemes ............................................................................................................................... 9 
2.2 THE EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL PARTIES – KANU AND KADU ................................................................... 11 
2.2.1 Constitutional debate and the dissolution of KADU........................................................................... 12 
2.2.2 The Kenyatta Era................................................................................................................................ 13 
2.2.3 Daniel Toroitich arap Moi.................................................................................................................. 16 
2.3 POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 1990S ................................................................................................... 18 
2.3.1 From one-party state to multi-party state........................................................................................... 18 
2.3.2 The elections of 1992 and 1997 .......................................................................................................... 19 
2.4 A NEW DEMOCRATIC ERA?......................................................................................................................... 22 
2.4.1 Towards a new national alliance........................................................................................................ 22 
2.4.2 New hope and prosperity .................................................................................................................... 24 
2.4 3 Constitutional affairs.......................................................................................................................... 24 
2.5 THE 2007 ELECTIONS .................................................................................................................................. 26 
2.5.1 The campaign ..................................................................................................................................... 26 
2.5.2 Results and Violence........................................................................................................................... 28 
CHAPTER 3 – THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.......................................................................................... 29 
3.1 VOTER BEHAVIOUR ..................................................................................................................................... 30 
3.1.1 Social structure................................................................................................................................... 30 
3.1.2 Long-term predispositions .................................................................................................................. 31 
3.1.3 Short-term factors............................................................................................................................... 33 
3.2 THEORIES OF ETHNICITY ............................................................................................................................. 36 
3.2.1 Primordialism and instrumentalism ................................................................................................... 37 
3.2.2 Ethnopolitics....................................................................................................................................... 38 
3.3 POLITICAL ENTREPRENEURS IN WEAK INSTITUTIONS................................................................................... 39 
3.4 VOTING BEHAVIOUR IN AN ETHNICISED SOCIETY ........................................................................................ 41 
CHAPTER 4 – METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH: ................................................................................... 44 
A QUALITATIVE CASE STUDY .................................................................................................................... 44 
4.1 SELECTION OF CASE: KENYA....................................................................................................................... 45 
4.2 FIELDWORK IN KOROGOCHO AND UASIN GISHU ......................................................................................... 45 
4.2.1 Korogocho .......................................................................................................................................... 47 
4.2.2 Uasin Gishu ........................................................................................................................................ 47 
4.2.3 Data Collection .................................................................................................................................. 48 
4.3 METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS ................................................................................................................ 52 
CHAPTER 5 - ANALYSIS................................................................................................................................. 53 
5.1 ETHNIC DIVISIONS ....................................................................................................................................... 53 
 i
5.1.1 Elite manipulation and the politicisation of ethnicity......................................................................... 54 
5.1.2 Politicisation of ethnicity; summed up................................................................................................ 60 
5.2 SOCIAL CLEAVAGES – ETHNICITY, RELIGION AND CLASS............................................................................. 61 
5.2.1 Ethnicity.............................................................................................................................................. 61 
5.2.2 Religion .............................................................................................................................................. 62 
5.2.3 Class ................................................................................................................................................... 63 
5.3 LONG-TERM PREDISPOSITIONS .................................................................................................................... 64 
5.3.1 Party identification – KANU .............................................................................................................. 64 
5.3.2 Value orientations............................................................................................................................... 66 
5.3.3 Ideology .............................................................................................................................................. 67 
5.3.4 Clientelism.......................................................................................................................................... 70 
5.4 SHORT-TERM FACTORS................................................................................................................................ 72 
5.4.1 Issue voting......................................................................................................................................... 72 
5.4.2 Retrospective voting ........................................................................................................................... 78 
5.4.3 Party leaders ...................................................................................................................................... 79 
5.4.4 Vote buying......................................................................................................................................... 81 
CHAPTER 6 – MAJOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION............................................................................ 83 
6.1 MAJOR FINDINGS......................................................................................................................................... 84 
6.2 CONCLUSION............................................................................................................................................... 86 
END NOTE ......................................................................................................................................................... 88 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................................................... 89 
LIST OF INTERVIEWS .................................................................................................................................... 95 
 ii
Abbreviations and Acronyms 
 
 
CIPEV Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence 
CDF  Constituency Development Fund  
DP  Democratic Party 
ECK  Electoral Commission of Kenya 
FORD Forum for the Restoration of Democracy 
IPPG  Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group 
KADU Kenya African Democratic Union 
KANU  Kenya African National Union 
KAU  Kenya Africa Union 
KHRC  Kenya Human Rights Commission 
KPU   Kenya Peoples Union 
LDP   Liberal Democratic Party 
NDP  National Democratic Party 
MoU   Memorandum of Understanding 
MPs   Member(s) of Parliament 
NPK  National Party of Kenya 
NAK  National Alliance Party of Kenya 
NARC  National Rainbow Coalition 
ODM   Orange Democratic Movement 
ODM-K  Orange Democratic Movement-Kenya 
PNU   Party of National Unity 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
 
 iii
Map of Kenya 
 
 
 
 iv
 v
Acknowledgements 
 
This process started with a one year long stay in Nairobi, Kenya in 2005/06. During 
my stay in Kenya and my work on economic justice in the East African network 
BEACON, my interests for Kenyan politics and society bloomed side by side with my 
warm feelings towards the Kenyan people. In the course of my work with this thesis I 
have later had a one year long break due to the birth of my beautiful daughter Hedda. 
 
First of all, I want to extend warm thanks to my supervisor Håvard Hegre for your 
patience, generous sharing of your time, academic capacities and encouragements. 
Warm thanks also go out to my other supervisor Arne Tostensen for inspiring 
discussions and constructive feedback – and for providing invaluable assistance in 
those crucial final minutes of the process.  
 
I further want to thank Norwegian Church Aid in Kenya and The Anglican Church of 
Kenya for facilitating my fieldwork in the Uasin Gishu district, and especially for 
providing me with access to the IDP camps in the area. Paul Mbole deserves my 
sincere gratitude for all the extra hours that were unreservedly given and that were so 
vital in order for me to carry out my travel to Uasin Gishu. Special thanks must go to 
Rev. Reirei who made my stay in Eldoret a memory for life.  
  
I am immensely indebted to Hellen Wanjiku for an exceptionally warm welcome in 
Nairobi and Korogocho and for sharing your knowledge and network with me, for 
your efforts as a reliable research assistant, and not the least for being a very good 
guide and friend. I am also grateful to Therese Vangstad who provided me and my 
family with a place to live during my two months of field work in Kenya. I will 
forever appreciate this opportunity we got to spend time together. Thanks also to the 
people surrounding KOCH FM for your openness, the interesting discussion we had 
and for making me feel like a part of the community in Korogocho.  
 
I want to thank friends and family for being around, in a long process. I’m lucky to 
have you all. I also want to thank my parents for financial, moral and never-ending 
support.  
 
Finally, thanks to Eivind for all our discussions and for your priceless inputs, practical 
assistance, fantastic spirit and unlimited support. I could never have done this without 
you! 
 
 
 
Oslo, June 2009        Sigrid Archer 
 

Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
On 27 December 2007, Kenya held its fourth multiparty elections since the democratic 
opening in the early 1990s. When the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) a few 
days later announced the winner to be the sitting president Mwai Kibaki, the country 
was plunged into a deep political, security and humanitarian crisis. The pre-election 
campaign was marked by a political rhetoric with strong ethnic undertones and a 
mobilisation that divided the country along ethnic lines. The turmoil and violence that 
ravaged the country led to the killing of over 1,200 people and the displacement of 
another 350,000 (Andreassen et al. 2008:5). 
  
Did we witness the end-result of an ethnic electoral battle where voters were driven 
exclusively by ethnic grudges and loyalties? The violence was undoubtedly ethnic in 
its character, but what about the election results and the rationales behind the electoral 
behaviour of the almost 10 million voters (Weis 2008:3) who cast their vote? Ethnicity 
is not the only significant marker in Kenyan politics, and to be able to give good 
answers to such questions the causal mechanisms behind Kenyan electoral behaviour 
must be addressed. There are reasons to believe that socio-economic policies and 
issues affecting the economic well-being of groups, communities or individuals could 
be equally important factors when explaining the Kenyan voting patterns.  
 
To most people Kenya had previously been seen as a haven of peace and stability in a 
troubled region, but the post-election crisis challenged the perception of Kenya as a 
stable and well-functioning democracy. While part of the international community 
reacted with surprise and shock to the events following the election, others interpreted 
them simply as the inevitable culmination of political tension that had been developing 
for decades. The turmoil and ethnic violence was however nothing new, except 
perhaps for the scale of it, as similar events occurred in connection with elections both 
in 1992 and 1997. These historic patterns strengthen the need and cause to re-examine 
the rationales and mechanisms behind Kenyan electoral behaviour.  
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The international media portrayed the post-election violence as an ethnic conflict. 
African countries are known to vote on ethnic lines, Kenya among them. However, 
although there undoubtedly was an ethnic dimension to the conflict arising after the 
2007 general elections, the underlying issues are more complex than just ethnicity. 
Anderson and Lochery (2008:1) state that “violence is a process, not an event.  Violent 
acts may be spontaneous, but they are more often the product of a longer sequence of 
historical decisions and political actions”. There is a general agreement that what 
triggered the post election violence in 2008 was a flawed election (Anderson and 
Lochery 2008: ICG report 2008: Waki report 2008). This tells us that elections and 
election results are important to the Kenyan people, and that voting matters. From 
previous experiences it seems like referenda and elections set off something inside 
many Kenyans that makes them fight for their interest and rights (Chitere et al 2006, 
Andreassen et al 2008). This spurs us to examine what these interests and rights are? Is 
it only ethnic affiliation that matters when Kenyans vote, or are there other interests 
that trigger Kenyans when they decide who to vote for? Or could it be a mixture of 
ethnicity and political preferences? 
 
Most literature points to ethnicity as the main factor explaining electoral behaviour in 
Kenya, and there is no denying that ethnic affiliation and loyalty play a significant role 
in determining electoral choice, but ethnicity can also be seen as an epiphenomenon -  
however, there are material foundations of ethnic thinking that are often not brought to 
the fore (Tostensen 2008:8).  
 
The question of distribution of land and debate on the form of government in the 
constitution has been two controversial issues since independence. And in the 2007 
general election the two main parties provided different answers to these two 
controversial issues. A new constitutional order, the devolution of power and an 
equitable distribution of resources and land were presented as the ODM’s (Orange 
Democratic Movement) agenda. The PNU (Party of National Unity) campaigned with 
the motto Kazi iendelee (“Work continues”) and emphasised economic recovery – the 
steady 5-6 per cent growth rate during the second half of Kibaki’s presidency allowed 
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Kenya to become financially self-reliant; Kibaki could therefore fund free primary 
education and create the constituency development funds (ICG 2008:4). Andreassen et 
al. (2008:8) state that in the election manifestos of the two main parties in the 2007 
election, the PNU can be seen as a conventional conservative party in the European 
sense and the ODM as a social democratic party concerned with distribution and 
power sharing. On this background, there are reasons to suggest that Kenyans vote for 
different parties and presidents on grounds of their different political conviction. 
 
1.1 Research question 
A debate on the relative importance of cultural identities and economic interests can be 
found in the literature of mass electoral behaviour (Crawford 1998). For advanced 
democracies, analysts agree that elections usually take the form of a referendum on the 
economy, with voters rewarding or punishing incumbent political parties at the ballot 
box depending on their past policy performance. Voters in new democracies and 
deeply divided societies are more commonly held to rely on cultural attachments when 
deciding how to vote. Norris and Mattes (2003) find that ethnicity and linguistic 
cleavages are important in explaining an individual’s support for parties in power in 
most, but not all, African countries. Identity voting is strongest in ethnically 
fragmented societies.  
 
If you lay a map of Kenya’s ethnic population over a map of the pattern of electoral 
results, you can clearly draw the conclusion that Kenyans vote ethnically. My interest 
in this thesis is why the circumstantial evidence shows that Kenyans vote ethnically. 
Although a lot has been written on ethnicity and ethno-politics in Kenya, there have 
been fewer attempts trying to explain the relationship between ethnic identities and 
policy interests. When it comes to the decisive act of voting, what do Kenyans care 
about? Are their ethnic origins the only point of departure, or are they equally or even 
more concerned about policy interests such as personal economic well-being, the 
performance of the economy, and the government’s record. The general question 
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addressed in the study may thus be formulated simply as: Why do Kenyans vote along 
ethnic lines? 
 
There may be a number of reasons why Kenyans vote ethnically. My preliminary 
hypothesis is that they do so mainly because they believe their particular electoral 
choices will benefit their economic interests, either directly as individuals or as 
members of certain groups or communities. This would then further imply that 
ethnicity acts as an intermediate variable or an epiphenomenon that in many cases 
serves as means to an end. Since it is impossible to explore all the different variables 
that affect how Kenyans vote, my research is based on a selection of different electoral 
theories that will be supplemented with theories of ethnicity. In my analysis I use both 
primary sources, in form of interviews and direct observation, and secondary sources 
in form of literature on political crisis, electoral behaviour and ethnicity.  
 
1.2 Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter 1 is introducing the thesis and explaining the research question. 
 
Chapter 2 describes the political developments leading up to independence and the 
demographic developments that followed during the period of the settlement schemes, 
which are so critical to understanding Kenyan voting behaviour. It further describes 
the evolution of political parties and presents the political developments in the 1990s. 
Finally, it describes the development from the historical 2002 election up until the 
election violence around the 2007 election. 
 
Chapter 3 lays the theoretical framework. It presents different theories of rational 
electoral behaviour and different theories of ethnicity and ethnopolitics. It will also 
discuss the role of political institutions and political entrepreneurs in politicising ethnic 
identity, and finally try to connect ethnic affiliation with the other political motivations 
for electoral behaviour.  
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Chapter 4 presents the methodological approach. I have placed this chapter here in 
order to ensure that it’s read in connection with the analysis, which is predominantly 
based on interviews made through my field work. The process of undertaking the field 
work and interviews is described thoroughly in chapter four and I believe it’s an 
advantage for the reader to have a clear recollection of this methodological approach 
when reading my analysis. 
 
Chapter 5 analyses the interplay between ethnicity and rational socio-economic voting 
behaviour. The chapter is organized around the theoretical perspectives presented in 
chapter three, and draws on and presents the key findings coming out of my field 
work.  
 
Chapter 6 goes through the major findings and draw conclusions.  
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Chapter 2 - Background to Kenya 
 
Kenya became a colony under the British Crown in 1895 when it was incorporated 
into the British East Africa protectorate, joining Uganda that had become a part of the 
protectorate a year before. In 1920 Kenya came under fully fledged colonial rule with 
a legislative council consisting of only Europeans (Rosenberg and Nottingham 
1966:20). The first political party created by Kenyans was the Kenya Africa Union 
(KAU) in 1946, under the leadership of Harry Thuku. Jomo Kenyatta (1891-1978) 
returned to Kenya in 1947 after many years of studies and work in Great Britain. He 
took over the leadership in KAU immediately after his return and started the fight for 
Kenyan independence. When Kenya gained independence from colonial rule in 1963, 
it set up a Westminster style of government with Jomo Kenyatta as the prime minister 
and KANU (Kenya African National Union) as the incumbent political party.  
 
This chapter starts by a brief account of political events from colonial times up to the 
independence in 1963, and the process of establishing settlement schemes. The 
following sections describe the evolution of political parties and the political 
developments in the 1990s. The final section describes the development from the 
historical 2002 election up until the election violence around the 2007 election. The 
political developments leading up to independence and the demographic developments 
of the settlement schemes are central to understanding the development from a one-
party state to a multi-party state in the 1990s, and crucial for understanding Kenyan 
voting behaviour. 
 
2.1 The run-up to independence 
Unlike many other African colonies, Kenya became independent, indirectly, as a result 
of an armed rebellion: the Mau Mau uprising that lasted from 1952 to 1959, when it 
was eventually defeated by the colonial government. The roots of the Mau Mau have 
been traced back to the agrarian policies of Kenya, which include the land alienation 
of Africans during the colonial occupation (Throup 1987). The structure of land 
 6
ownership, and access to land in general, was an integral part of the reconfiguration of 
political order, fusing the issue of land, constitutional choice and local interests. The 
combination of these issues has been reflected in the country’s two rounds of 
constitutional debates; one during the time of independence, the other began in the 
1990s and is still ongoing. Both debates revolve around the question of land in the 
social economic order, and regional autonomy in the political order. I will return to 
this debate later. 
2.1.1 Developments in Central Province 
European agricultural settlement in Kenya followed in the wake of the “Uganda 
Railway” which was built between 1897 and 1901 from the Kenyan coastal town of 
Mombasa to Kampala in Uganda (Odingo 1971:27). In 1903 there were already 100 
white settlers around the growing railway camp of Nairobi, and between then and 1960 
there were a series of “waves” of settlers arriving from many sources, including Great 
Britain, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand. In 1920 there were 1,122 settlers 
occupying 2,103 hectare of land in the whole of Kenya and in 1960 there were 3,600 
settlers engaged in agriculture occupying 3 million hectares of land (Odingo 1971:40).  
 
The Central Province of Kenya was chosen for occupation by white settlers because 
the land was fertile and the region was close to the growing marked of Nairobi. The 
colonial government encouraged settlements in this area to increase railway traffic on 
the new railway. When the settlers arrived and settled, they began to push for a new set 
of policies that barred Africans from owning land in European “zones” and relegated 
them to “native reserves” (Bates:1989:19). The Kikuyu ethnic group originally 
occupied the Central Province, and land had for some time already become 
increasingly scarce due to population growth and subdivision of land. The confiscation 
of land and the creation of native reserves reinforced this trend. Earlier, land was 
relatively abundant; but with the white settlers grabbing huge areas of fertile land, this 
era was definitively over. The African population had plenty of labour, but lacked 
access to land. 
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2.1.2 Developments in the Rift Valley 
At the same time, there was a growing need among the white settlers in the fertile 
highlands of Kenya’s Rift Valley, later referred to as the White Highlands, for casual 
labour in their farming activities. Thus, driven by the overcrowded conditions in the 
reserves in central province and the white settlers’ bid for labour in the White 
Highlands, about 150,000 Kikuyu from the Central Region migrated to the White 
Highlands – not as land owners, but as workers on European farms (Gisemba 2008:3). 
These labourers were called squatters. The squatter system was based on a labour 
contract, whereby a squatter had to work for at least 180 days of work a year in return 
for the cultivation of some of the white settlers’ land and for grazing of livestock. The 
contracts were later expanded until in most cases they reached a level of 240 days a 
year (Odingo 1971:42).  
 
The Kalenjin who originally occupied the land the white settlers took were also 
squatters. Since they traditionally were pastoralists they where not interested in land 
ownership and title deeds in the same way as the Kikuyus were. The Kalenjin were 
satisfied with grazing access for their herds. Land among the Kalenjin was not 
regulated by individual ownership, but by communal rights and access to pastures. The 
creation of individual land ownership during colonialism was an institutional change 
that worked in favour of the Kikuyu traditions. By changing the structure of land 
ownership, new incentives for individual and group choices and behaviour where 
created (Andreassen 2003:119). These events, and the new dynamics they set in 
motion, contributed to the creation of conflicts between Kalenjin and Kikuyu in the 
Rift Valley Province.  
2.1.3 The Mau Mau 
In the demobilisation of the armed forces after the World War II, demobilised officers 
were encouraged to purchase land in the colony of Kenya, and they were given 
training in the newly opened Egerton School of Agriculture in the Rift Valley (Bates 
1989:24). This put more pressure on the African squatters, and the white settlers also 
used their political power to alter the original contracts with the squatters, reserving 
 8
the right to keep cattle in the Highlands for themselves. This eventually led to the 
resettlement of around 100,000 Kikuyu squatters back to the native reserves in Central 
Province, where they faced an economic reality quite different from what they had left 
(Gisemba 2008:3). The traditional Kikuyu areas where overcrowded and land values 
were high. The traditional Kikuyu elite used their power in this situation to maximize 
land rights for their family and kin. For the returnees from the white settler areas in the 
Rift Valley this had serious consequences. They felt they had been squeezed twice; 
first, by the white settlers and the colonial government who threw them out of the Rift 
Valley and, second, by their wealthy kinsmen who denied them returning to land in 
Central Province (Bates 1989:29). A militant radicalism evolved among the losers in 
the struggle for land rights in Central Province, organised from 1949 as the Mau Mau 
uprising. When national political leaders emerged in the late 1940s they used the 
mobilising potential of this radicalism to expand their political base. The Mau Mau 
came to represent the radical and militant wing of the nationalist, anti-colonial 
movement, but to a large degree this war also represented a civil war within the 
Kikuyu ethnic group. 
2.1.4 Settlement schemes 
Pre-colonial settlement schemes  
With the political conditions in the colony of Kenya having reached a precarious and 
volatile level in the 1940s, the colonial government attempted to forestall a political 
crisis by establishing “native settlement schemes” to relocate those evicted from the 
White Highlands. The Olenguruone settlement scheme located in the remote areas of 
the Rift Valley Highlands was one of the first of this kind. The colonial government 
purchased 37,400 acres of land in Olenguruone in the 1940s to relocate approximately 
4,000 Kikuyu squatters who had been displaced by the white settlers (Kimenyi and 
Ndugu 2005:141). Little attempt was being made to deal with claims from indigenous 
groups to lands earmarked for settlement. Olenguruone was originally Masaii and 
Kalenjin land and the settlement scheme created deep animosity between them and the 
new Kikuyu inhabitants. The colonial government created similar settlement schemes 
in other areas of the Rift Valley which all created similar animositiy (Ibid).    
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After the Mau Mau was defeated in 1959, the colonial government responded to the 
looming political unrest by initiating a programme of rural development by supporting 
the growing and marketing of cash crops and a policy of land consolidation. The land 
consolidation programme abolished the former system of squatters in the Rift Valley. 
This created a class of “landless” squatters but, at the same time, the land was for sale 
to Africans who could afford to pay the price defined by the settlers; these where 
primarily wealthy Kikuyu (Rosenberg and Nottingham 1996:304). Thus, the right to 
land ownership was used as a measure by the colonial government to ally itself with 
the wealthy and the conservative elites, primarily among the Kikuyu. For the Kikuyu 
themselves this was an opportunity to settle again in the Rift Valley, but this time as 
land owners and not as squatters. 
 
Post-colonial settlement schemes 
The post-independence settlement schemes designed to transfer land from white 
settlers to Africans was similarly controversial. In a programme known as the Million 
Acre Settlement Scheme, carried out between 1962 and 1967, the new independent 
government bought a number of European farms – ostensibly to settle landless people 
(Kimenyi and Ndugu 2005:141). In the planning of the Million Acre Scheme the 
intention was that settlement areas would be taken over by communities already living 
in adjacent areas – so as to allow local communities to ‘take back’ lands that they had 
claimed prior to the advent of European settlement, or to take ownership of lands upon 
which they may have ‘squatted’ as tied labourers over many years (Anderson and 
Lochery 2008:7). The land was not to be given back freely to African occupation, 
however, but purchased at prevailing market rates. The transactions under the Million 
Acre Scheme were accordingly conducted on the basis of willing-buyer-willing-seller, 
and this condition quickly disrupted the initial intention to give priority primarily to 
local communities. A small number of schemes were reserved for landless farmers, 
with favourable leasing and credit arrangements.  In the Rift Valley a variety of types 
of settlement scheme emerged, but only a small number was allocated solely for the 
use of local communities. By 1975 there were more than 250 government-sponsored 
settlement schemes throughout the country; the majority in the Rift Valley Province or 
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along its borders. More than 1,300 farms had been purchased for settlement by the 
government, and nearly 70,000 families had moved onto these schemes (Anderson and 
Lochery 2008:8). 
 
The methods used for the allocation of plots on these schemes varied over time, but in 
the initial phase local administrators, including chiefs and headmen, compiled lists of 
squatters and landless, and a lottery was held. There appears to have been little 
complaint about this procedure, and the majority of those given land were in these 
situations anyway Kalenjin. However, from the late 1970s changes in the 
administrative procedures resulted in the transfer of the responsibility for allocating 
plots on the schemes to the provincial administration, thus placing the process under 
the direct control of the Office of the President (Ibid:9). This may have resulted in a 
greater degree of corruption in the allocations process. Anderson and Lochery (2008:9) 
also note that the ethnic patterns of occupancy on the schemes quickly became more 
complicated as settlers re-sold plots. The extent of this lively trading of land on 
settlement schemes was not anticipated when the schemes were first established, and it 
has had a dramatic impact on the ethnic composition of some areas. These schemes 
have been a source of ongoing quarrel over land in the Rift Valley. I will come back to 
this later in the chapter. 
 
2.2 The evolution of political parties – KANU and KADU 
As independence approached, the land issue emerged as an issue of major political 
controversy. In 1959 the British proposed a resettlement programme in the Highlands 
and in 1960 they established a new system where Africans were given majority status 
in the legislative and executive councils. The result of these changes was a scramble 
for power among competing local elites who formed two political parties: the Kenya 
African National Union (KANU) and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). 
At the centre of their differences lay conflicts over land (Bates 1989:46). 
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KANU was formed in March 1960 and although it was principally multicultural in its 
set-up, the new party was allegedly dominated by representatives from the Kikuyu and 
Luo communities (Andreassen 2003:130). The leadership denied such allegations, but 
the perception of KANU as a Kikuyu-Luo alliance nevertheless persisted among the 
smaller ethnic groups. Many smaller ethnic groups and their members, for instance the 
Masaii and the Kalenjin, had lost tracts of their tribal land to the white settlers. In 
response to the formation of KANU many of these groups organised their own 
“welfare” associations, such as the Maasai United Front, the Kalenjin Political 
Alliance and the Coast African Political Union. In June 1960 these and other small 
ethnic groups coalesced to form KADU. The main difference between the parties was 
that KANU favoured a unitary form of government while KADU opted for a federalist 
or regionalist approach that favoured the set up of Majimbo (majimbo is the plural 
form of jimbo which means region) – ethnically constructed, autonomous regions 
governed by regional assemblies. KADU wanted to place land resources under 
regional political control and not, as did KANU, to allow the free-market principle of 
“willing seller – willing buyer” to operate (Andreassen 2003:131-134).   
2.2.1 Constitutional debate and the dissolution of KADU 
In the 1950s the constitution governing the colony underwent several reforms, largely 
in response to rising demands from African nationalist forces. In the election of 1961 
Kenyans won the majority of seats in the legislative council. KANU won 19 seats 
against KADU’s 11, but refused to form a government due to prevailing restrictions 
against a number of leading African politicians, including Jomo Kenyatta. As a result, 
the British governor persuaded KADU to form a minority government in coalition 
with European and Asian members of the Legislative Council. This government, 
however, was tightly controlled and was not allowed to exercise effective political 
leadership (Andreassen 2003:135). Yet, the KADU administration managed to attain 
the adoption of a so-called Majimbo Constitution, a federal constitution with 
autonomous regions. The KANU delegation at the Lancaster House negotiations saw 
the introduction of Majimboism as yet another white settler strategy in the battle to 
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protect their property and privilege in a society that would soon be dominated by the 
African majority. 
 
In May 1963, the scene was set for the introduction of self-government, through 
elections on a general roll. As in 1961, KANU won the greatest number of seats – this 
time with 42 against KADU’s 28. Contrary to 1961 however, KANU now formed a 
majority government with Jomo Kenyatta as the prime minister. Six months later, on 
the 12 December 1963, Kenya was granted full independence (Ibid 2003:137). 
 
The majimbo/federal constitution in Kenya proved to be short lived. After KANU won 
the election in 1963, they changed the constitution within months and a unitary 
government structure was introduced. This was made possible through the exploitation 
of opposition leaders’ interest in a manipulative power game1, and these events 
ultimately led to the dissolution of KADU. Bates (1989:60-63) argues that the reasons 
why the transition to independence was so peaceful was the mixture of motives 
surrounding the land issue. The fact that politicians may have had political interests 
different from the economic interests of their constituencies was one element, and the 
fact that the institutional framework handling the land settlement programme enabled 
KANU to exploit conflicting motives and interests within the ethnic alliance that made 
up KADU, was another. In mid-1964 individual politicians started to defect to KANU, 
and KADU was finally dissolved in November 1964. The first member of the KADU 
leadership to defect was the president of the Rift Valley Assembly, Daniel arap Moi 
(Ibid).     
2.2.2 The Kenyatta Era 
According to Ochieng´ (1989:214-216) there have existed two types of politics in 
Kenya since the formation of the first nationalist party, the Kenya African Union 
(KAU) in 1944. One was based on ideological differences manifested in 
confrontations between advocates of a “capitalist” economy and those preferring a 
“socialist” model. At the time of independence this cleavage was reflected within 
                                                 
1 For more information on these events, see Bates (1989) 
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KANU as a division between radicals, with the Luo politician Oginga Odinga 
representing the socialist (liberal) side, and most of the rest of the party’s leadership 
including Jomo Kenyatta representing the conservative side. The other type of politics 
is mainly concerned with which ethnic group is controlling the state. This politics of 
state control can be called “politics of tribalism” (Ibid:215). Ochieng claims that the 
proponents of the politics of tribalism were found within the conservative camps of 
KANU and KADU alike, which also preferred a capitalist market economy. 
Nevertheless, the image presented by Jomo Kenyatta did not reflect his position on 
these issues in the internal power struggles of KANU. On Independence Day, Kenyatta 
appeared before the Kenyan nation and announced that his government would build a 
democratic African State. The benefits of economic and social developments would be 
distributed equitably and differential treatment based on tribe, race, beliefs or class 
would be abandoned (Ochieng 1995:91-92). The institutions of police and army, the 
economic systems and the administration were preserved from the colonial state. The 
economy was oriented more in the direction of capitalism and foreign investments. 
Critics of Kenyatta declared that this began to look as though the old colonial power 
had simply transformed itself into one where Kenyatta was a new-style Governor and 
the Kikuyu had replaced the Europeans as the top dogs. His later rival Oginga Odinga 
claimed that in Kenya under Kenyatta there was “not yet uhuru” (freedom) (ibid:106). 
 
The African politicians had been standing united together through independence, but 
already in 1963 the divisions between different factions inside KANU became visible. 
The radical forces within KANU still wanted social and economic development and 
they criticised Kenyatta for doing nothing to improve the conditions of neither the 
peasants nor the workers, and claimed than KANUs African socialism was only a 
blind to cover for capitalism and exploitation of ethnic divisions (Ochieng 1995:91-
95). 
 
One of the internal disagreements concerned the settlement schemes. Kenyatta 
heralded the settlement schemes as a huge success, seeing them as a symbol of Kenyan 
‘nation building’ and stressing the fact that any Kenyan had the opportunity to move to 
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any part of the country to take advantage of the opportunities such schemes offered. 
From the perspective of the Kalenjin communities of the Rift Valley, the picture 
seemed less rosy. When the Million Acre Scheme had first been mooted some 
Kalenjin communities railed against the notion that they should be asked to pay to get 
back the land they claimed had originally belonged to them anyway (Anderson and 
Lochery 2008:10). Although the Luo were not much involved in the different 
settlement schemes, the radical camp of KANU with Odinga as a leading spokesman 
supported the Kalenjin claim from an ideological perspective. Campaigns were 
organised to boycott the auctions and allocation processes. In other areas Kalenjin who 
had wanted land but lost out in the initial allocations found themselves out-bid by 
Kikuyu, Kisii or Luhya buyers when plots were re-sold. Suspicions about the 
allocation procedures also became increasingly rife, with accusations that land were 
corruptly granted to politicians and civil servants.  
 
By 1965 the Kikuyu-Luo alliance within KANU had failed, and the radical wing with 
Oginga Odinga in front, left KANU to form the Kenya Peoples Union (KPU) as a 
“socialist alternative”. These events did not influence Kenyatta significantly; he was 
instead bent on continuing the political line he had started. According to Ochieng 
(2005:97) he saw his political enemies as “paid agents of communists whose mission it 
was to dethrone him”. Addressing a Kenyatta day rally in Nairobi on 20 October 1967, 
he said: 
 
As from today KPU are regarded as snakes in the grass. Let them re-examine their minds 
and return to KANU. If they do not do so, KPU should beware! The fighting for our 
uhuru is on. Whoever has ears to hear, let him heed this (Ibid:98).   
 
Kenyatta used whatever means he could to stop the defections from KANU to KPU, 
and in the 1966 by-election he used instant land resettlement to undermine the appeal 
of KPU Kikuyu leaders (bribing KPU leaders of Kikuyu extraction by giving them 
land), thus leaving the electoral support for the KPU leader Odinga almost entirely to 
the Luo community. Three years later, in 1969, the prominent Luo leader Tom Mboya, 
a KANU minister and a politician many considered an aspiring successor of Kenyatta, 
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was assassinated. Kenyatta himself was sceptical to the young Mboya because he 
feared he could at some point turn against his own party. Based on these sentiments on 
the part of the President, there where rumours of Kenyatta having ordered the killing 
(Miller and Yeager 1994:46). Ethnic violence, allegedly instigated by Kikuyu leaders, 
erupted as an after-effect of the murder. Trying to deal with the accelerating ethnic 
strife and antagonism, Kenyatta relied increasingly on repressive politics, including the 
banning of the KPU. 
 
From the time of these events until Kenyatta’s death in 1978, KANU aimed at forging 
a loose alliance of several ethnic groups with the Kikuyu, but trying at the same time 
to isolate Odinga and his supporters, Luo as well as non-Luo. With a balancing act 
between punishment of opponents and rewards to followers, Kenyatta maintained 
political stability. The cohesion between different ethnic groups and classes in Kenya 
was the result of an effective system of patron-client relationships; in 1978 this system 
influenced ethnic groups in the most remote areas of Kenya (Miller and Yeager 
1994:59). At the same time Kenyatta increasingly relied on the judiciary, the police 
and the Kikuyu-dominated army; Kenya became a one-mans show. During the 1970s 
several radical politicians and academics were imprisoned for alleged criminal 
behaviour, and some were killed (Ochieng’ 1995:102-103). 
2.2.3 Daniel Toroitich arap Moi 
Kenyatta remained in power until his death on 22 August 1978. Following his demise, 
the fight to become Kenyatta's successor turned into a power struggle marked by 
political, economic and ethnic interests. And even though Kenyatta's closest allies had 
put their money and hopes elsewhere, Vice President Daniel arap Moi came out of this 
power game as the country's next President.2  
 
The theme of continuity marked the presidency of Daniel arap Moi, emphasized by the 
choice of Nyayo (footsteps) as the watchword of his administration. This was 
especially true when it came to economic policies. Economic interest groups and 
                                                 
2 For more information and background on this power struggle following the death of President Kenyatta, see 
Ochieng and Ogot 1995:187-191 
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classes that had been influential during the Kenyatta era kept their positions under 
Moi, and the government remained committed to a capitalist-oriented, mixed economy 
and economic policies that aimed at creating and sustaining a high rate of economic 
growth. Private property ownership was guaranteed and foreign investment was 
encouraged through legislative provision for the repatriation of profits. Moi was 
dependent on support from several ethnic groups and was in many ways forced to lead 
a similar policy to that of Kenyatta (Maxton and Ndege 1995:152). 
 
When Moi assumed the presidency in 1978, he consolidated his power in two strategic 
moves. During his first four or five years in office, he gradually reduced the Kikuyu 
influence in the state and created room for his own loyal constituency, predominately 
groups from the previous KADU alliance; the so-called KAMATUSA (Kalenjin, 
Masaii, Turkana and Sambura) communities. These communities became the bedrock 
of the regime (Waki report 2008:25). Over time, the support base was extended to 
include other KADU groups such as the Luhya and the Mijikenda of the Western and 
Coast Provinces, respectively. He de-Kikuyuised the state, but tried to keep the 
support of the Kikuyu with mixed results. He could not use Kenyatta’s confidantes; he 
had to create new co-operative relationships. Despite his rhetoric of national unity, 
Moi embarked upon a strategy of ethnic engineering even as he castigated any public 
reference to ethnicity as a “subversive tribalism”. Open debate about ethnicity was 
restricted and regarded with suspicion, but ethnopolitics was widely practised 
(Andreassen 2003:245).  
 
Intolerance of politicians who were in opposition to KANU had existed ever since the 
banning of Oginga Odinga’s KPU party in 1969. Between 1969 and 1982 Kenya had 
remained a de facto one-party state. In May 1982, George Anyona (a radical politician 
and critic of KANU politics) was detained without trial and Oginga Odinga was put 
under house arrest when they tried to register an opposition party. After an attempted 
coup a constitutional amendment was rushed through parliament making KANU the 
only political party. Kenya was now a de jure one-party state. KANU continued to be 
divided not on ideological lines, as was the case between 1960 and 1970, but on the 
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basis of political factions where relationships and events were determined by groups 
thinking and personal advantage. Factions also entailed the existence of patron and 
client relationships (Ogot 1995: 202-203). 
 
2.3 Political developments in the 1990s 
In the 1990s, the quest for democracy had taken a whole new form. Change in 
international relations due to the end of the Cold War, and the democratisation of 
Eastern Europe added pressure for “democracy” in the whole of Africa. Intellectuals, 
the churches, lawyers and activists from within the non-government community 
(mainly the urban civil society) in Kenya seized upon the opportunity to put their 
claim for political pluralism in an international context. 
2.3.1 From one-party state to multi-party state 
In 1991, Kenyans followed with keen interest as several African states moved towards 
multipartyism. The pro-democracy movement was spearheaded by veteran politicians, 
priests, lawyers and academics. They expressed their opinion through new privately 
owned journals, newspapers and magazines as well as some well established 
newspapers such as Daily Nation and Standard. This new pro-democracy movement 
was not well received by Moi’s government, who claimed that multipartyism would 
generate ethnic tension and threaten political stability. From June 1990, the KANU 
government carried out a major offensive against pro-democracy activist, denouncing 
them as ‘traitors’, ‘tribalists’, ‘anarchists’, and ‘agents of foreign powers’. A licence to 
hold a public rally by the opponents was declined, but on the 7th of July 1990 
thousands of Kenyans streamed into Uhuru Park in central Nairobi. The clash with the 
police left 28 people being killed and 1,400 arrested (Ogot 1995:240-241).  
 
It was now evident that political pluralism had enormous support in Kenya, contrary to 
KANU propaganda. More and more people began to speak openly and defiantly 
against the regime. Gradually as pressure from different opposition groups increased, 
the KANU government was left with the alternatives of major confrontations with the 
pro-democracy movement or a controlled transfer to multi-party politics. The pressure 
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increased further when Oginga Odinga in February 1991 launched an opposition party, 
the National Democratic Party (NDP),3 which was not granted formal recognition. The 
failure to register NDP only prompted the opposition to find new strategies, and in 
August 1991 a group of eight opposition figures formed the Forum for the Restoration 
of Democracy (FORD) comprising of the major ethnic groups in Kenya, the Kikuyu, 
the Luo and the Luhya and some sections of the Kamba and Kisii communities, and 
supported by foreign donors (Ogot 1995:242, Andreassen 2003:158). In December 
1991, the Moi government gave in to domestic and foreign pressure and repealed the 
one-party section 2a of the constitution, making Kenya a multi-party democracy again. 
2.3.2 The elections of 1992 and 1997 
The repeal of section 2a of the constitution created an entirely new situation for the 
KANU government, as there was now a chance of losing future elections.  To secure 
future political power KANU carefully crafted a new strategy with five main 
components: (i) to encourage division in the opposition; (ii) to manipulate the rules 
and procedures of electoral competition; (iii) to manipulate electoral support in 
selected rural and cosmopolitan areas by means of ethno-political disturbances; (iv) to 
use the vast resources of the state in favour of the incumbent party, e.g printing money 
to finance the electoral campaign; and (v) electoral fraud. In all of these respects the 
incumbent government was successful (Tostensen et al. 1998:5). 
 
Domestic and international observers cast serious doubts on the freedom and fairness 
of the 1992 election. The voter registration process was seriously flawed, because the 
state failed to issue the necessary number of ID cards to eligible voters. The 
nomination process was flawed and barred a number of candidates from presenting 
their nomination papers. Opposition candidates were bribed to withdraw from the 
election. At the same time, the opposition had gone from being a united movement to a 
number of different fractions of various ethnic and regional groups represented by 
different “strong men” wanting to become the new President. The situation thus soon 
turned to the disadvantage of the opposition. In February 1992, Mwai Kibaki, who had 
                                                 
3 The NDP is later known as Raila Odinga’s (the son of Oginga Odinga) party, he joined the NDP in 1994 after 
he left Ford-Kenya when he did not win the leadership of that party. 
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been Vice-President for KANU in 1978-88, registered a new party, the Democratic 
Party (DP) which had the potential of making serious inroads into the Kikuyu vote. 
There was also tension inside FORD and by August 1992 it split into two rival parties; 
FORD-Kenya, led by the Luo Oginga Odinga, and FORD-Asili, led by the Kikuyu 
Kenneth Matiba. The incumbent party took advantage of the situation claiming that 
they had been right all along that multi-party politics would inevitably divide the 
country along ethnic lines, and that only KANU was able to maintain a truly national 
profile and secure political stability (Tostensen et al. 1998:5-7). 
 
The last part of KANU’s strategy, to manipulate electoral support through ethno-
political violence, became the most critical and with fatal consequences. People in 
certain areas were killed or chased out of their land by gangs of armed ‘warriors’. As 
early as October 1991, a series of ‘tribal clashes’ erupted in Western Kenya, and up 
until the 1992 elections about 800 lives had been taken and tens of thousands of 
Kenyans had been internally displaced (Andreassen 2003:174). Independent observers 
and analysts concluded that the pattern of ethno-political violence was targeted at 
members of communities supporting the opposition (the Kikuyu and the Luo in 
particular), and that the pre-election clashes were an attempt to cleanse certain areas of 
opposition supporters. The post-election violence, on the other hand, represented 
‘punishment’ of the same communities for not supporting KANU (Andreassen 
2003:173-175). 
 
The irregularities instigated by the government during the election strengthened the 
already uneven power relationship between the opposition and the incumbent and 
secured the re-election of KANU. Two of the most important electoral law reforms the 
regime introduced before the election were the 25-per-cent clause, requiring that a 
presidential candidate, to be duly elected, would have to garner 25 per cent support in 
five of the country’s eight provinces, in addition to the plurality of the votes cast, and 
that the elected president had to choose its government entirely from its own party 
(Tostensen et. al 1998:6). 
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The run up to the 1997 elections was equally characterized by irregularities both when 
it came to the registration of voters, registration of candidates, opposition candidates’ 
possibilities to run a campaign, and politically motivated pre-election violence 
(Tostensen et. al 1998:39-43). Although the pre-election period of 1997 saw less 
violence than in 1992, the violence that occurred was very similar to events in advance 
of the 1992 elections. The violence was designed to spread a culture of fear in areas 
with widespread multicultural composition, and it was in the interest of the incumbent 
regime. The pre-election violence in 1997 took many forms, from widespread unrest 
on the coast to ethnic clashes in the Kisii-Trans Mara border areas and isolated cases 
of intimidation in other areas. In the Coast Province the violence led to around 200 
people killed, and in the country as a whole, thousands of families were again 
internally displaced (Andreassen 2003:198). 
 
The most significant difference between the two elections was the increased 
democratic space resulting from the IPPG (Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group) 
package. The IPPG resulted from co-operation between the KANU government and 
the opposition, leading to minimal reforms such as improvement in the freedom of 
movement, assembly and expression. Nevertheless, in terms of cleavages in the 
political landscape of Kenya, the 1997 elections were similar to those of 1992. The 
distinct ethnic pattern was reproduced and reinforced, at the level of party make-up 
and voting. One great difference, however, with respect to the presidential contest was 
the fact that Kenya for the first time in its political history saw a woman candidate, 
indeed two. Charity Ngilu gathered nearly half a million votes, a good accomplishment 
by any standards in a male-dominated society (Tostensen et al. 1998:51). 
 
Neither the 1992 nor the 1997 elections were fair. However, the overdue IPPG reform 
package no doubt made the electoral environment measurably fairer in 1997 compared 
to 1992. KANU did not show the same strength in 1997 and won only 113 seats in the 
parliament to the opposition’s 109, meaning that KANU failed to secure enough seats 
to be able to amend the constitution. Thus, Moi and KANU were unable to change the 
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two-term limit on presidential re-election introduced through the political reforms in 
1992 (Steeves 2006:200). 
 
2.4 A New Democratic Era? 
After two disputed elections in the 1990s, many saw the 2002 Kenya elections as a 
milestone for democracy in Africa, as opposition leader Mwai Kibaki defeated 
KANU’s presidential candidate Uhuru Kenyatta, and both parties accepted the results. 
With this transition Kenya joined the ranks of African countries where power has 
changed hands through the conduct of peaceful, democratic, and multiparty elections. 
The run-up to the elections however, was characterised by an intense power struggle of 
ethnic coalition-building within the political parties. 
2.4.1 Towards a new national alliance 
The 1997 results showed that the opposition had the potential strength to win the 
elections if they managed to field one common candidate. The possibility to end the 
four-decade KANU rule was the driving force behind the conglomerate of shifting 
political alliances prior to the 2002 elections. The opposition faced the challenge of 
uniting behind one presidential candidate with sufficient support. This culminated in 
the formation of a broad opposition alliance in October 2002 (Songstad 2003:7). 
 
In the run-up to the 2002 elections, Moi sought to craft a broader ethnic coalition for 
KANU. The merger between KANU and the National Development Party (NDP), led 
by Raila Odinga, came in April 2002 after the NDP had already been given four 
cabinet posts in Moi’s government at the beginning of 2002. Odinga was now given 
the powerful post of Secretary-General in the ‘New KANU’. The NDP had its primary 
support in the Luo-dominated part of Nyanza Province. Another major change was 
made at the same event, namely the introduction of four new vice-chair positions, each 
held by ethnic leaders – Musalia Mudavadi of the Luhya, Kalonzo Musyoka of the 
Kamba, Katana Ngala of the Mijikenda and Uhuru Kenyatta of the Kikuyu. The 
merger was expected to counter KANU’s dwindling support and to increase the 
possibility to win the upcoming elections (Steeves 2006:200).  
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In May 2002, the Democratic Party (DP), FORD-Kenya and the National Party of 
Kenya (NPK), and 10 other minor parties and two pressure groups formed the National 
Alliance Party of Kenya (NAK). In September 2002, the NAK nominated Mwai 
Kibaki as the presidential candidate with Michael Wamalwa as his running mate. 
Kibaki had strong support among the Kikuyu and their close relations, the Meru and 
Embu communities. Wamalwa had strength among the Luhya and in addition the 
previously mentioned Charity Ngilu had support among the Kamba (Songstad 2003).  
 
Uhuru Kenyatta, son of Kenya’s first president, Jomo Kenyatta, was President Moi’s 
favoured heir to the presidency. However, the opposition against Moi’s choice grew 
within the new KANU and the opposing group became informally known as the 
Rainbow Alliance. The dissident group consisted of prominent politicians who all 
wanted to succeed Moi as the President of Kenya. The Rainbow Alliance remained 
within KANU until 14 October when KANU formally nominated Uhuru Kenyatta as 
the presidential candidate. The Rainbow Alliance then defected from KANU and took 
over the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), one of the many fringe parties in Kenyan 
politics (Songstad 2003). 
 
Shortly after the defection from KANU, the LDP leaders met with NAK leaders to talk 
about a possible coalition. After intense negotiations, a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) was reached in which the two forces formed The National 
Rainbow Coalition (NARC). Mwai Kibaki who had been nominated the NAK 
presidential candidate became the NARC presidential candidate, but the MoU stated 
that the LDP and NAK would share equitably in the allocation of ministerial portfolios 
and other government and parastatal appointments (Steeves 2006:202). Michael 
Wamalwa retained the position as Kibaki’s running mate. The four most central 
politicians in NARC were Mwai Kibaki, Michael Wamalwa, Charity Ngilu and Raila 
Odinga. These four commanded a total of per cent of the presidential vote in 1997. 
 
KANU never had a chance against a united NARC which drew support from the whole 
country. The NARC campaign hammered home that KANU and Moi had driven the 
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country to ruin. NARC on the other hand would introduce free primary education, 
revitalize the economy, rebuild the decaying infrastructure, rejuvenate the agricultural 
sector, adopt zero tolerance to corruption, create 500,000 new jobs a year and deliver a 
new constitution for Kenya within 100 days of taking office. NARC’s appeal of ‘time 
for a change’ swept KANU out of power and ended the country’s 24-year period with 
Moi at the helm. NARC captured 125 parliamentary seats to KANU’s 64. (Steeves 
2006:202-203). 
2.4.2 New hope and prosperity 
For the average Kenyan the results of the 2002 election generated hope for a new and 
better future. Kenyans stood together as a nation and expected a genuine break from 
the pre-2002 period in terms of policy change and style of politics. The Kibaki 
government faced an enormous task of rebuilding the faith and accountability in 
politics. As Steeves (2006:204) put it, “Kenyans now had the understanding of their 
new-found power that if the leadership faltered, they too could be turfed out the next 
time around”. NARC had made a number of promises to the voters and Kenyans 
expected to see results. 
 
The Kibaki government was able to make some major changes, most notably restoring 
the national economy onto a growth path and introducing free primary education. 
Nevertheless, it failed on one crucial element; the promise to introduce a new 
constitution within 100 days of forming a government. Additionally, the MoU signed 
between the LDP and NAK was violated from the very outset (Steeves 206:204).  
2.4 3 Constitutional affairs 
According to the MoU there was to be equity in cabinet appointments, in the senior 
public service among permanent secretaries, ambassadors and in the heads of 
parastatals. However, Kibaki and his close circle allocated 9 ministers to LDP and 16 
to NAK including the portfolios finance, justice and constitutional affairs, local 
government, national security and the head of civil service. At the same time, Kibaki 
sought advice and gave power to a close group of advisers called the ‘Mt.Kenya 
Mafia’ (Steeves 2006:205). The bitterness of the LDP ministers only grew with the 
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passing of time as the MoU was thoroughly undermined. The final straw for the 
NARC government came when the NAK fraction of the government rejected and 
changed the constitutional draft known as ‘the Bomas draft’ in 2005. 
 
The design of the constitution had been a controversial issue since independence, as 
we have seen in section 2.1. The demand for constitutional change in the post-
independence period began at the turn of the 1990s with the first call for a return to the 
multiparty system of government. The eventual introduction of the multiparty system 
of government in December 1991 was accompanied by the re-establishment of an 
electoral management body – the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) – appointed 
by the president (Chitere et. al 2006:2). The NAK ministers protested to the Bomas 
Draft provisions dealing with the presidency and decentralisation. The draft reduced 
the power of the presidency by converting the office into a more symbolic role as head 
of state and introduced a new powerful executive prime minister post. A new structure 
of decentralised government would be introduced as well, featuring regional 
governments with significant powers and finances. Kibaki and his ministers introduced 
a Consensus Bill which allowed parliament to amend the constitutional draft. A new 
draft, ‘the Wako draft’, was passed by Parliament. This draft restored the imperial 
presidency with the post of prime minister being reduced to government leader of the 
House, and the paragraphs on decentralisation was watered down to a level where only 
a minor form of district government was introduced (Chitere et.al 2006:11, 21). 
 
In November 2005, the Wako Draft was the basis for the national referendum on the 
constitution. The Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) supervised the referendum. 
The LDP ministers still remained in Kibaki’s cabinet, but during the run-up to the 
referendum the LDP fraction and the NAK fraction campaigned on two different sides. 
The ECK used fruit symbols of the two sides of the contest. The Banana became the 
symbol of the ‘Yes’ side which comprised a majority of cabinet ministers along with a 
sizable number of NAK-affiliated MPs. The Orange became the symbol of the ‘No’ 
side led by seven LDP ministers, LDP MPs, the opposition leader Uhuru Kenyatta, and 
KANU MPs alongside leading civil society organisations which wanted the ‘people-
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driven’, ‘Wanjiku’ constitution: the Bomas Draft (Steeves 2006:206). In the process of 
campaigning against the Wako Draft constitution, the Orange group became the 
Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) fighting against a constitutional proposal that 
was seen to limit the democratic opening. On 21 November 2005, Kenyans rejected 
the Wako Draft with 58.1 per cent for the ODM ‘No’ side against 41.9 per cent for the 
Banana ‘Yes’ side. Kibaki dissolved the cabinet after the referendum defeat and on 
appointing a new cabinet, left out all the members of the LDP who had previously 
served in the government. The ODM registered as a political party in August 2006.  
 
The failure of the NARC coalition to work together towards a better future for all 
Kenyans disappointed and frustrated the general population. The division within the 
political elites and the frustration among Kenyans laid the foundation for an intense 
election campaign towards the 2007 general elections. 
 
2.5 The 2007 elections 
The 2007 presidential election was without doubt the closest since the restoration of a 
multiparty system in December 1991. After the constitutional referendum in 
November 2005 a number of prominent political leaders saw themselves as future 
presidential candidates. The struggle to become the presidential candidate split the 
ODM into two different parties; ODM-Kenya with Kalonzo Musyoka as the candidate, 
and ODM which eventually selected Raila Odinga as the presidential candidate. The 
remains of the NARC coalition together with KANU (without its Secretary General 
William Ruto, who stayed in ODM) and twenty other big and small political parties 
formed a new Party of National Unity (PNU) in August 2007, with Kibaki as its 
presidential candidate.  
2.5.1 The campaign 
The election campaign period was marred by several violent incidents, but not to the 
extent experienced in 1992 or 1997. The worst pre-election violence in 2007 was in 
Western and Rift Valley Provinces. Longstanding land conflicts between neighbouring 
communities escalated as their leaders positioned themselves within the PNU or the 
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ODM, and youths were mobilised to intimidate voters (ICG 2008:3). The ODM 
represented the largest coalition and ten weeks before Election Day the ODM wave 
seemed unbeatable. Odinga held a 16 per cent lead in opinion polls, and the youth 
vote, one of the most important new factors, was expected to guarantee his victory. 
 
The ODM campaigned on democratic change and promised to bring an ‘Orange 
revolution’ to Kenya, defending the poor and the weak against a government 
controlled by a clique of business people close to Kibaki. They attacked the Kibaki 
government and referred to three acts of betrayal: reneging on the 2002 pre-election 
MoU on power sharing: subverting the Bomas draft of a new constitution, and the 
failure to act on its commitment to zero tolerance on corruption. A new constitutional 
order, devolution and equitable distribution of resources were presented as ODM’s 
alternative agenda. The PNU campaigned with the motto Kazi idendelee (let the work 
continue) to underline the continuity of progress if re-elected. It emphasised economic 
recovery – the steady 5-6 per cent growth rate during the second half of Kibaki’s 
presidency, which has allowed Kenya to fund free primary education and create 
constituency development funds (CDFs). Free secondary education was one of Kibaki 
main re-election promises (Andreassen et al. 2008:55-57). 
  
Several factors probably contributed to the erosion of Odinga’s lead in the polls. The 
PNU aggressively attacked the ODM on its majimbo agenda accusing it of fomenting 
ethnic cleansing of migrant communities under the guise of majimboism. A related 
campaign was launched by the PNU against the MoU signed by the ODM and the 
Muslim leadership, alleging a secret deal to establish Sharia (Islamic) law in the 
Muslim-dominated areas. Also contributing to the reduction of Odinga’s lead were 
personal attacks against the ODM leadership, based on deeply rooted ethnic prejudice 
that cut across society. Nevertheless, as the campaign ended, the Steadman polling 
institute still gave Odinga a 2-percentage point lead in the presidential race (ICG 
2008:5-6).  
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2.5.2 Results and Violence 
All national and international observers reported that while the voting and counting of 
ballots at polling-station level was orderly and satisfactory with a few exceptions, the 
tallying and compiling of the results were manipulated, dramatically undermining the 
credibility of the results announced by ECK chair Kivuitu on 30 December 2007 (ICG 
2008:6). Immediately after the ECK announcement, riots broke out across the country, 
mainly in the larger cities of Nairobi, Kisumu, Eldoret and Mombasa. The ferocity and 
speed of the violence caught many by surprise. Hundreds were killed in less than 24 
hours. Houses and shops were set ablaze. Thousands began fleeing. By the second day, 
Kenya appeared to be on the brink of civil war. According to humanitarian agencies 
and figures revealed by the Kenyan authorities, by the end of February 2008 at least 
1,200 people had been killed. Estimates of the number of internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) varied between 350,000 and 600,000 (Andreassen et al. 2008:5). 
 
The violence came to an end with the power-sharing agreement between the PNU and 
the ODM brokered by the chief negotiator Kofi Annan and the mediation team of 
Eminent African Persons on 28 February 2008. The government of national unity is 
supposed to govern the country until the next general elections in 2012. 
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Chapter 3 – Theoretical Framework 
 
My assumption is that Kenyans vote ethnically mainly because they believe it will 
promote their economic interests, and that ethnicity acts as an intermediate variable or 
an epiphenomenon that in many cases serves as a means to an end. Political science 
theory offers various explanations of voter behaviour. Electoral behaviour has been 
thoroughly studied by European scholars. It may be useful to look at the different 
explanatory models used by these scholars to see if any of them can be transferred to 
African societies in general and to Kenya in particular. The first group of theories 
presented are theories of electoral behaviour. 
 
The second group of theories are theories of ethnicity, as political science theory 
attributes much weight to ethnicity when dealing with African elections, highlighting it 
as one of the main explanatory models. The traditional divide in debates on ethnicity is 
between those who see ethnicity as fundamentally a psychological trait and ethnic 
conflict as a result of ancient hatreds between groups (primordialists), on the one, and 
those who regard it as a powerful political instrument in the hands of political elites 
(instrumentalists), on the other. Both of these are challenged, however, by others who 
regard ethnic identity as but one of several identities, highlighting the need to analyse 
the interplay between ethnicity, institutions and politics, and the reasons why ethnicity 
becomes relevant in specific historical situations.  
 
I go on to discuss the role of political institutions and political entrepreneurs in 
politicising ethnic identity. Historical struggles that transform cultural identity into 
political identity always require political entrepreneurs, individual leaders, and elites to 
interpret discrimination or privilege in ways that make cultural identity politically 
relevant to their targeted constituencies. 
 
The last section of this chapter sums up the previous sections and connects ethnic 
affiliation with the other political motivations underlying electoral behaviour. 
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3.1 Voter behaviour 
The tradition originating from Rokkan and Lipset’s book “Party systems and Voter 
alignments” from 1967 has been the most influential one in European research on 
electoral choice. Their theoretical approach and the cleavage structure they suggest is 
still relevant to understanding and explaining electoral behaviour. Even though almost 
all literature that deals with electoral behaviour has originated from the electoral 
setting in Europe or the United States, elements of the same explanatory models can be 
utilised when explaining or seeking to explain African electoral behaviour.   
 
An individual voter’s decision to choose one alternative over another in an election 
may of course have a range of different rationales and explanations. I will in this 
section go through some of them. 
3.1.1 Social structure 
Thomassen (2005) goes through the most prominent approaches to explaining electoral 
behaviour in Europe. The first one is focused on social structure and originates from 
Lipset and Rokkan. This political-sociological approach is based on the idea that 
electoral choices are based on a limited number of social cleavages. The most 
important dimensions are social class (owner vs. worker), religion (state vs. church) 
and ethnicity. The argument is that if you belong to a certain segment of society and 
there is a political party present who represents that particular segment, you would 
vote for that party (Thomassen 2005:10). A central point in the social cleavage model 
is that the party system is not a mere reflection of the cleavage structure. The 
alignment process could take different routes depending on the institutional context at 
certain points in the democratisation process, and the parties once founded were actors 
seeking survival with an interest in keeping the alignments to the voters (Oskarson 
2005:85). The connection between people’s social position and party choice is not a 
coincidence, but tends to be more or less institutionalised in the party systems. The 
social cleavages of a society are in most cases reflected in the origin of the party 
system. 
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3.1.2 Long-term predispositions 
A more or less stable system of relations between political party and voter is not 
necessarily based upon the social position of the latter. Party identification has the 
function of ensuring people’s lasting attachment to a political party. Party 
identification is a “long-term, affective, psychological identification with one’s 
preferred political party” (Thomassen 2005:11). It has been recognised that the 
strength of partisanship is an important predictor of people’s political attitudes and 
behaviour. Partisan ties help orient the individual through the complexities of politics 
and mobilise individuals to participate in parties, elections, and the processes of 
representative government. Party identification has been much more powerful in 
Europe than in the United States. In European parliamentary systems, political parties 
and not individual politicians are the principal actors linking voters to governmental 
institutions. Policies leave little leeway for individual candidates to run their own 
campaigns for office and offer few incentives for voters to deviate from their party 
preference in favour of individual candidates from another party (Berglund et al. 
2005:106). This is quite different from US and African politics where policy 
formulations to a large degree depend on individual candidates, and where the 
characteristic of the candidate has considerable significance in addition to party 
background. I therefore expect to find party identification to be less important in 
Kenyan elections.  
 
A similar argument is made regarding values. The cleavage model suggests that 
people’s electoral choices are determined by group membership irrespective of their 
value orientations. However, such an interpretation is missing the point. A cleavage 
implies some set of values common to the members of the group. An individual will 
not vote for a party out of ‘objective’ group interests without sharing the values of the 
party representing the group. When an individual casts a vote, political values are 
prescriptive beliefs which individuals would like to see implemented in the political 
system. Political values thus influence the participation by which individuals seek to 
influence politics (Knutsen and Kumlin 2005:125). The argument made in European 
electoral theory is that even when social cleavages lose political significance, the value 
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orientation that historically was part of this social cleavage might not lose its 
significance. In other words, the independent impact of value orientation will increase. 
For instance, even though the class cleavage might lose importance, the value of 
“equitable distribution of income” might still be of great importance. This means that 
voters will tend to vote for political parties that holds the same principal values as 
themselves. 
 
We further have the ideological denomination of parties and voters. The ideological 
approach is based on the assumption that people’s political preference is connected to 
the left-right dimension, originating from French politics where the radicals sat on the 
left side of the president, and the conservatives on the right side (Thomassen 2005:15). 
The left-right continuum can also be described as a cleavage between socialists and 
capitalists over a political spectrum dominated by the emphasis on power analysis and 
economic interests. A rational voter would, according to the fundamental argument in 
the ideological approach to electoral behaviour vote for the party located at the 
shortest distance from the voter’s own location on the left-right continuum. The 
ideological argument is inherently different from the argument of party identification. 
The vocabulary of left and right emphasises a cognitive-based instrumental mode of 
electoral behaviour, whereas party identification stresses the affective dimension and 
identification with political parties rather than instrumentality (Cees van der Eijk et al. 
2005:167). Left-right orientations of citizens are customarily found to be one of the 
most important factors that determine European voters’ choice at the ballot box. 
During the fight for independence, when African political systems where being 
shaped, the division between capitalism and socialism was at the centre of events. This 
was also the case in Kenya (as explained in chapter 2). Even though the Kenyan party 
structure has gone through various transformations since then, there are reasons to 
explore the contemporary impact of the left-right orientations in Kenyan electoral 
behaviour.  
 
Another long-standing predisposition of electoral behaviour is found in clientelism. In 
a society built on political clientelistic networks voters would vote for the preferred 
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party of their patrons in exchange for social or economic gains. Lemarchand (1972:69) 
characterise political clientelism as “a more or less personalised relationship between 
actors (i.e., patrons and clients), or a set of actors, commanding unequal wealth, status 
or influence, based on conditional loyalties and involving mutually beneficial 
transactions.” A patron-client relationship may for instance exist between the elder in a 
clan and the rest of the clan or directly between the constituency’s MP (Member of 
Parliament) and the citizens of that constituency. The purpose of a clientelistic 
network is thus the exchange of resources and ensuring a particular distribution 
pattern. Many African societies have been characterised as clientelistic, Kenya among 
them. Keefer (2007) argues that clientelist politics is most attractive in conditions of 
low productivity, high inequality, and starkly hierarchical social relations, mainly in 
young democracies. Under these conditions, regular citizens have a hard time 
believing the different political parties and leaders because they do not see any change 
in their living conditions, no matter who governs the country. One strategy that 
political parties and leaders tend to use in these societies is to rely on patrons, whose 
clients trust them but not the candidates.  By relying on patrons, candidates do not 
have to invest their own resources in building credibility. Candidates create new 
patron-client relationships with a certain number of elders who in exchange for large 
economic and social favours, will ensure that a great number of voters actually vote 
for this particular candidate (Keefer 2007:806). In societies where clientelistic 
networks are prevalent voters will therefore choose the favoured political party of their 
patron in return for economic or social gains. 
3.1.3 Short-term factors 
In Europe there has been a shift away from the style of electoral decision-making 
based on social group and/or party cues towards a more individualised and inwardly 
oriented style of political choice. Issue voting can be described simply and clear-cut: 
voters are basing their choice on particular issues that are salient at the election in 
question. But issue voting is often more complex, and Borre (2001:13) defines issue 
voting as comprising of the following three elements: (i) Issues concerning the goal of 
politics (‘values’); (ii) Issues as discussions about what should be on the top of the 
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agenda (Issue salience); and (iii) Issue performance in terms of the voters’ perceptions 
of competence and credibility among parties and candidates. In theory there is a clear 
difference between values and issues. Political values may be defined as ‘prescriptive 
beliefs about which goals [one] would like to see implemented in the political system 
and about desired participatory forms to influence politics’, whereas political issues 
are often more narrowly defined – capturing particular policy proposals or political 
circumstances (Aardal and Wijnen 2005:195). In practice, however, it may be difficult 
to distinguish clearly between issues and values. Nevertheless, all issues are not of the 
same kind. There are issues that divide the public into proponents and opponents, and 
issues regarding which the public tends to agree on the ends, but not on the means 
necessary to reach that end. Examples of issues are “unemployment” or “inflation”. 
Citizens tend to vote for the parties that are perceived as competent to handle salient 
issues. 
 
Retrospective voting presupposes that voters are measuring past performance and 
future prospects relative to their self-interest. Retrospective evaluations can be 
important along many types of issues where governments have responsibility for 
policy outcomes. However, among issue domains, economics is by far the dominant 
dimension for the study of retrospective voting (Listhaug 2005:213). Retrospective 
voting theory puts stronger emphasis on the individual citizen as actor, often 
independently of parties and other collective structures and bonds of loyalty. A key 
question in this research is, however, to what extent voters base their vote on their 
personal economic situation (egocentric voting) and to what extent they base their vote 
on the performance of the national or regional economy (sosiotropic voting)?   
 
It is asserted that if a voter is uncertain of what her political preferences are and 
undetermined regarding what the vital issues are for her, then she will focus her 
attention on leaders. Television has become a principal medium in an election 
campaign, and radio still reaches the masses effectively in many developing countries. 
The personality of the leader and the goal of projecting a positive image of the leader 
have therefore become highly relevant for the way parties wage their election 
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campaigns. At the same time, party leaders have acquired greater control over the 
message their party attempts to sell. Party leaders, one could claim, have become the 
most accessible and prominent feature of election campaigns (Curtice and Holmberg 
2005:236). It can therefore be argued that in a complex world, where citizens have a 
hard time seeing the benefits of the policies the different parties espouse, it is rational 
to decide to vote for the overall trustworthiness and competence of the party leader, 
rather than the detailed promises made by the different parties at election time.  
 
As mentioned above, in young democracies under conditions of low productivity, high 
inequality, and starkly hierarchical social relations, regular citizens have a hard time 
believing the different political parties and leaders because they do not see any change 
in their living conditions, no matter who governs the country. Keefer (2007:806) 
claims that candidates with severe credibility problems have recourse to two possible 
strategies to make credible promises to at least some voters. One is, as stated earlier, to 
rely on patrons, whose clients trust them but not the candidates. Another strategy in 
this respect is to invest resources to build up their credibility among voters directly by 
vote-buying. The practice of vote-buying occurs in many societies and organisations, 
and in different forms. Obvious examples include direct payments to voters, the 
buying of voting cards and the promise of specific programmes or payments to voters 
conditional on the election of a candidate (Dekel et al. 2008:2). In societies where it is 
possible to buy an individual’s voting card, this would have a real effect on the 
outcome of the election. In societies where you can bribe the individual voter, but not 
being able to monitor what happened in the polling booth it might not have the same 
effect, but vote-buying can still have an effect on the electoral choice of the individual. 
If an individual does not have a clear opinion of whom to vote for, money might be a 
decisive factor.   
 
The theories on voting behaviour range from social cleavages to long-term 
predispositions and short-term factors. All these theoretical approaches might be 
helpful in addressing and explaining voter behaviour in Kenya. However, in 
attempting to describe and explain social and political mechanisms, political crisis, 
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violence, armed conflict and elections in Africa, political science theory gives much 
weight and emphasis to the importance of ethnicity, highlighting it as one of the main 
explanatory variables. This emphasis is echoed by the coverage of African elections in 
western and international media, where ethnic voting is a much repeated phrase. 
Examining the importance of ethnicity and reviewing how it relates to the above cited 
theories could therefore be decisive for the task at hand. It is therefore necessary to go 
through some of the main theories of ethnicity. 
 
3.2 Theories of ethnicity 
The word “ethnic” is derived from the Greek ethnos (which in turn derived from the 
word ethnikos), which originally meant heathen or pagan (Hylland Eriksen 1993:5). It 
was used in this sense in English from the mid-14th century until the mid-19th 
century, when it gradually began to refer to "racial" characteristics. None of the 
founding fathers of sociology, political science and social anthropology – with the 
partial exception of Max Weber – accorded ethnicity much attention. 
  
Since the 1960s, however, ethnic groups and ethnicity have become household words 
in social anthropology and political science. Nothing close to a consensus has 
emerged, however, about the effects of ethnicity; let alone what it is in the first place. 
For some, ethnicity is an emotion-laden sense of belonging or attachment to a 
particular kind of group (Horowitz, 1985; Shils, 1957). Others see ethnicity as a social 
construct or a choice to be made (Barth, 1969). Some even call ethnicity a biological 
survival instinct based on nepotism (Van den Berghe, 1981). A few consider it a mix 
of these different notions ( Fearon & Laitin, 2000). All approaches agree, however, 
that ethnicity refers to aspects of relationships between groups which consider 
themselves, and are regarded by others, as being culturally distinctive. When 
approaching the politicisation of ethnicity and its relevance in a voting scenario, 
theorists tend to take the discussion on the divergence between the primordialist and 
instrumentalist perspectives as their point of departure. I will follow in their footsteps 
and start with this dichotomy. 
 36
3.2.1 Primordialism and instrumentalism  
Arguments on how ethnicity emerges and becomes politicised can be placed along a 
continuum between a primordialist and an instrumentalist perspective. This dichotomy 
goes back to the 1950s and 1960s. While primordialism grew out of studies of the 
“new states” in Africa and Asia and was part of the modernisation school, 
instrumentalism can be traced back to the Manchester school of anthropology that 
studied ethnicity of urban African communities in the 1950s (Andreassen 2003:81-82). 
  
According to the primordialist view, social organisation and politics are deeply 
influenced by primordial attachments such as blood, language, religion, and tradition. 
These attachments are so fundamental that political institutions that ignore them will 
meet difficulties. This was the case, for instance, with the newly independent states 
after decolonisation (ibid:81). Eller and Coughland (1993 quoted in Andreassen 
2003:81) name three assumptions of a primordialist perspective:  
 Primordial identities are given, they exist a priori. They are natural and 
‘spiritual’ rather than sociological, they have long histories, and all interaction 
is carried out within primordial ties; 
 Primordial sentiments are ineffable. Members of ethnic groups feel group 
attachment as natural and necessary, and they are compelled and overpowered 
to feel this attachment; 
 Primordialism is fundamentally a question of emotion and affect.  
 
Opposed to primordialism is instrumentalism, where ethnicity is seen as an instrument 
used for political or material purposes. In this perspective, people mobilise to compete 
for resources or in other ways fight for their interests, and ethnicity might be used as a 
tool for mobilisation. Political elites, for example, may find it useful to encourage or 
even to create ethnic affiliations in order to garner political support. In other words, 
ethnic identity is a dynamic phenomenon, which can change in tandem with political 
change. Far from the primordialist perceptions of ethnicity as givens, instrumentalists 
see ethnicity as a political phenomenon responding to a large extent to changes in 
social and political circumstances.  
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Primordialists and instrumentalists share, however, the understanding of ethnicity as a 
major independent force in politics. The difference lies in how they view the origins of 
ethnicity and the ways in which they assume ethnicity influences politics.  
3.2.2 Ethnopolitics 
In his book Ethnopolitics (1981), Joseph Rothschild summarises the insights of the 
substantial amount of literature published on ethnicity in politics, mostly by the end of 
the 1970s. This literature focused on ethnicity as a “modern political phenomenon” 
concerned with interethnic relations and the role of political entrepreneurs in arousing 
ethnic sentiments.  
Joseph Rothschild sees ethnicity as a “plastic, variegated, and originally ascriptive trait 
that, in certain historical and socio-economic circumstances, is readily politicised” 
(Rothschild 1981:1). In modern and modernising societies he finds that such fertile 
circumstances for the politicisation of ethnicity abound. This is so because these 
societies have structured interethnic inequalities as well as entrepreneurs who have an 
interest in mobilising ethnicity into political leverage to alter or reinforce these 
structured inequalities. As a consequence, “in modern and transitional societies – 
unlike traditional ones – politicised ethnicity has become the crucial principle of 
political legitimation and delegitimation of systems, states, regimes, and governments” 
(ibid:2).  
 
Rothschild suggests a theoretical structure where ethnic politics is determined by: a) 
inequities in the distribution of resources to different ethnic groups; and b) the ethnic 
groups’ uneven access to the state. This model assumes a conscious choice of identity 
among the people as well as agency among political leaders (traditional and modern). 
Leading from this, he offers a definition of the politicisation of ethnicity: to politicise 
ethnicity is to “render people cognitively aware of the relevance of politics to the 
health of their ethnic cultural values, and vice versa; … to stimulate their concern 
about this nexus … to mobilise them into self-conscious ethnic groups ... and ... to 
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direct their behaviour toward activity in the political arena on the basis of this 
awareness, concern, and group consciousness” (Rothschild 1981:6).  
 
Rothschild describes how political entrepreneurs awaken ethnic sentiments and thus 
make politics become ethnicised. If a society is structured in a way in which 
differences in economic well-being or class (access to land and state resources) 
correlate with ethnicity, ethnicity becomes a strong mobilisation tool. 
 
3.3 Political entrepreneurs in weak institutions 
When deciding how to vote, in any given situation, the individual will have a given 
number of parties and candidates to choose from. The party system and list of 
candidates have been developed, shaped and institutionalised over time. It is therefore 
important to understand how the electoral system is operating and what flora of parties 
there is to choose from in order to comprehend how individuals think when deciding 
how to vote. The existing system is the context within which the individual is 
compelled to operate. When explaining why ethnicity and ethnic tension have become 
predominant factors in electoral behaviour in a certain country or electoral entity, it 
must be done through reviewing its relevant economic, political, and institutional 
context.  
 
Beverly Crawford (1998) suggests that the key to explaining cultural and ethnic 
tension and cooperation lies in political institutions, which can create incentives for 
cooperation and competition. Prevalence of cultural tension is higher where culture has 
been historically politicised. Institutions in modern states, however, often play a 
crucial role in cementing, creating, or attenuating cultural or identity politics that have 
been created in historical power struggles.  
 
Politicisation of cultural identity: Social interests and divisions can be defined in many 
different ways, of which ethnic division is one. But although different divisions exist, 
not all of them become politically relevant. If ethnic divisions are important in 
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elections, they first have to be politicised; cultural identities must be transformed into 
political identities. Political institutions can either legitimate or attenuate politicised 
cultural identities. In Latin America, it was class rather than ethnicity that became a 
politically relevant division, whereas in Africa ethnicity has more typically become 
politicised. So, how and why do cultural or ethnic divisions become politically 
relevant? One example can be found in colonial policies where colonial powers used 
divide-and-rule tactics along ethnic lines. These policies created the opportunity for 
political entrepreneurs among colonised groups to draw on cultural identities to 
mobilise resistance to imperial control, gain access to political power and territory, and 
exercise power in the construction of new national institutions when colonial power 
collapsed. In both apartheid South Africa and in the period of slavery and the Jim 
Crow laws in the United States race was politicised by internal political elites in ways 
that led to similar historical struggles (Crawford 1998:18).  
 
Such historical struggles that transformed cultural identity into political identity 
always required political entrepreneurs, individual leaders, and elites to interpret 
discrimination or privilege in ways that made cultural identity politically relevant to 
their targeted constituencies. It was, however, the institutions of the central state that 
determined whether or not politicised cultural identity would be cemented in social 
and political practice and whether culturally defined groups would seek autonomy, 
separatism, or the right to participate with others in the political arena (ibid.:20). The 
legal regulations for the government can either strengthen or weaken the politicisation 
of ethnicity, depending on the importance it gives to ethnic division as compared to 
other divisions. States that privilege one or several ethnic groups over others in terms 
of political participation or resource distribution, for example, legitimate politicised 
ethnic divisions and may intensify them or even create political groups based on 
identity. Conversely, states that base their rules of participation and resource allocation 
on other criteria than ethnic division weaken the political relevance of ethnic 
differences (ibid.:24).  
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Institutional change, political entrepreneurs, and bandwagoning: In societies where 
ethnicity is politicised, political legitimacy is low, resources are scarce or institutions 
are put under pressure or weakened, political entrepreneurs may emerge with both the 
incentive and the opportunity to exploit ethnic cleavages and perceived inequalities in 
an effort to mobilise popular support. Leaders may be tempted to privilege particular 
ethnic groups, because patronage networks of resource distribution have few 
transaction costs. A feeling of relative or permanent exclusion from development 
resources – a perception of unjustified group differences – may lead to a collective 
perception in an ethnic community for the need to organise politically in the pursuit of 
their anticipated future benefits (Andreassen 2003:91). This may succeed if political 
institutions encourage identity politics and if prohibitions against the practice of 
extreme identity politics are weak. As entrepreneurs start to practice identity politics 
the cost decreases for others to join. As support for these policies becomes widespread, 
the costs of not joining may increase. Likewise, identity policies spread from one 
ethnic group to others when leaders and members of groups see another group 
mobilising behind ethnic slogans. Ethnicity policies are thus created as a defensive 
strategy, and further accentuate tensions. These processes, which can be termed 
“bandwagon effects”, may escalate ethnic tensions and provoke violence, especially in 
times of an election (Crawford 1998:25).  
  
3.4 Voting behaviour in an ethnicised society  
In societies where ethnic identity has been politicised, and where political 
entrepreneurs and elites consequently refer to and present discrimination and privilege 
in ways that reinforce ethnic identities as something politically relevant, the party 
system will be greatly influenced by this ethnicisation of politics and structured 
accordingly. If this is indeed the case, the different parties or political leaders will as a 
result also represent different ethnic groups or different constellations of ethnic groups.  
 
However, other significant divisions between these parties could also exist, based on 
central political issues, core values or ideological orientations. And even though voters 
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might put decisive emphasis on these other aspects of a party or politicians’ policies 
and practices, they will still be confined to making their choice and casting their vote 
among the ethnically defined parties that exist. The end result is that the observer who 
aims at understanding and analysing electoral behaviour within such a political context 
will have problems identifying which of several competing causes give rise to what 
she observes. Voters will be perceived to be giving their votes to their ethnic kin or 
ethnically representative political party, but could according to themselves be making 
issue-based choices or choices based on ideological preferences. 
 
The different commonly assumed rationales for an individual to vote for one party 
instead of another, as presented in section 3.1, must therefore be reviewed against the 
contextual backdrop of the ethnicised society. Voting behaviour related to social 
structure, long-term predispositions and short-term factors must be interpreted in a 
political-institutional context where ethnicity is a predominant factor. 
 
 
Model 
The model below is a visualization of the most important elements in the analysis and 
how they relate to each other. The figure should not be interpreted as a causal model. 
Rather, the arrows in the model signal that we want to discuss how one element 
influences the other.  
 
             
  →→ ↔             ↔        → 
 
Sosial Structure Long-term 
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Short-term 
factors Dependent 
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- Religion 
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choice 
- Ethnicity - Value orientations - Retrospective 
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orientations  - Political 
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- Vote buying  
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Political-institutional context 
  Ethnicity 
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Voting behaviour related to social structure, long-term predispositions and short-term 
factors must be interpreted in a political-institutional context where ethnicity is a 
predominant factor. I will analyse the different rationales in chapter five when 
examining the example of Kenya, and try to differentiate between identity or ethnic 
ties as reasons for voting behaviour and the different rationales put forward by 
distinctive electoral choice theories.  
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Chapter 4 – Methodological Approach:  
A Qualitative Case Study  
 
The study is conducted as a qualitative case study. A case study is defined by Yin 
(1994:13) as “an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident”. The question of boundaries is crucial. Chabal and 
Daloz (1999:148) argue that in African politics there is a constant and dynamic 
interpretation of different spheres of human experience. All aspects of life appear to 
affect, immediately and decisively, all others. In other words, all variables are 
dependent. “It is hardly possible, for example, to study voting patterns in national 
elections as we would in western societies” (Chabal and Daloz 1999:148). Yin 
continues by saying that case studies are preferable when you ask typical “how” and 
“why” questions. A case study is also fertile when you seek a deeper understanding of 
the phenomenon you are researching (Andersen 1997). 
 
The contemporary phenomenon under study here is the electoral behaviour in Kenya. 
But instead of looking at how people vote statistically, this research is about the 
reasons why Kenyans vote the way they do. There are a lot of contextual factors that 
need to be taken into consideration when considering electoral behaviour. It is 
impossible to measure or uncover these factors by quantitative analysis, experiment or 
other methods; a case study is thus fruitful. A case study is recognised by the use of a 
variety of techniques for collecting information. I choose an approach that is mainly 
qualitative with primary emphasis of semi-structured interviews. The advantage of the 
qualitative approach is that it gives you broad, detailed and complex information of the 
subject you are interested in. The purpose of the study is to explain electoral 
behaviour. The case study is suitable for this purpose because it makes it possible to 
draw on a wide variety of evidence (documents, interviews, and observation) (Yin 
1994:8) as well as to consider a wide range of variables (ibid:13) which is necessary to 
grasp a complex phenomenon.  
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4.1 Selection of case: Kenya 
My interest in Kenya developed when I was living and working for a regional NGO 
called BEACON (Building Eastern Africa Community Network) in 2005/06. During 
my stay in Kenya at that time, the country went through a campaign to change the 
constitution, resulting in a referendum on the matter on 15 November 2005. The 
campaign and the aftermath of the referendum sparked my interest in the political 
situation of Kenya. 
 
If we look at the post-independent political history of Kenya, there are some 
contentious issues that have remained unresolved since independence. The two most 
controversial issues are distribution of land and the design of the constitution which by 
many are seen as reflecting historical injustices. These issues have through history 
been the cause of several disputes and conflicts, most lately during the post-election 
violence in 2008. Election campaigns in Kenya have often been waged using ethno-
political sentiments as a driving force, and thus, the conflict over the distribution of 
land and the making of the constitution become ethnic issues. 
 
Ethnicity is often seen as the overriding factor in Kenyan politics, and there is no 
denying that ethnic affiliation and loyalty play a significant role in determining 
electoral choice, but ethnicity can also be seen as an epiphenomenon. (Tostensen 
2008:8). There are material foundations of ethnic thinking that are often not brought to 
the fore. The historical injustices are perhaps the most important ones. The dynamic 
and blurred boundaries between ethnic affiliation, material well-being and historical 
injustices when it comes to choice of political party and president is not properly 
researched, and is largely missing in the literature about ethnicity and ethno-politics in 
Kenya. The purpose of my research is to explore this dynamic. 
 
4.2 Fieldwork in Korogocho and Uasin Gishu 
The fieldwork was conducted from 22 August until 3 October 2008 in Nairobi and in 
the Rift Valley. Or more precisely in the Korogocho slum in Kasarani district in 
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Nairobi, and in Uasin Gischu district, which is the same as Eldoret municipality, in the 
Rift Valley. It provided access to written information, allowed me to conduct 
interviews, as well as to follow political events and debate over a period of time, thus 
giving me an understanding of the nature of the political situation that would not have 
been possible without a stay of this duration. Because of the time constraints, the 
fieldwork was limited to two cases: Korogocho and Uasin Gischu. The two cases 
represent one urban and one rural community. Both areas have a diverse ethnic 
composition, and were affected by the post election violence.  
 
However, this geographical limitation gives the study a certain bias: while I had good 
access to people living in an ethnically mixed environment, I did not have the same 
opportunity to talk to people living in areas with one predominant ethnic group. 
Balancing this, I’ve extensively had conversations and interactions with people from 
such places during my time in Nairobi, both during my fieldwork and during the 
period I was living there. I was also able to visit large parts of the country and have 
interactions with communities in several such ethnically homogenous areas as part of 
my work in Kenya in 2005/06.     
 
The one year I was living and working in Kenya in 2005/06 hence served as a 
backdrop to my understanding of the political and social situation in Kenya. The basic 
knowledge of the country that I acquired made it easier to carry out fieldwork in a 
relatively short period, and made my encounters with the Kenyan people more fruitful. 
 
I chose the areas for my field work based on various criteria. 56 % of Kenya’s 
population are defined as poor (UNDP report 2006). Thus the average, regular Kenyan 
is poor. My target group is regular Kenyans. The majority of these regular Kenyans are 
peasants living in rural areas, but an increasing percentage of the poor are urban poor 
living in slums or informal settlements. On that background I chose one urban and one 
rural community. Since ethnicity is vital in my research, another selection criterion 
was ethnic diversity. Additionally, the land issue is vital in Kenyan politics. In Uasin 
Gishu district conflicts linked to ethnicity and land has been manifest several times; 
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both in 1992, 1997 and during the post-election violence in 2008 the district was 
affected extensively. Since I only had the possibility to stay in Kenya for six weeks, a 
final criterion was feasibility. Contacts I had from the time I was living in Kenya made 
the access to Korogocho possible. I further made arrangements in Uasin Gishu through 
the network of NCA Kenya (Norwegian Church Aid - Kenya) and its partner ACK 
(Anglican Church of Kenya).   
4.2.1 Korogocho 
Korogocho is a slum in Nairobi that houses some 120,000 dwellers crammed within 
one single square kilometre. It is made up of 7 villages called: Highridge, Grogan, 
Ngomongo, Ngunyumu, Githaturu, Kisumu Ndogo/Nyayo and Korogocho. It is one of 
more than 200 slums in Nairobi, covering altogether a mere 5% of the city’s territory. 
The population in the slums is estimated at 2.5 millions, out of a total of 4 million 
Nairobians. Korogocho ranks fourth in population size after Kibera, Mathare and 
Mukuru Kwa Jenga. It is an illegal settlement born in the early seventies. Most of the 
land is state property. The slum is multi-ethnic, counting some 30 ethnic groups; 
Kikuyu, Luo and Luhya are the major ones. The socio-economic reality is extreme 
poverty; there are no public services and the absence of the state is keenly felt 
(www.korogocho.org).  
4.2.2 Uasin Gishu 
Uasin Gishu District is one of the seventy-one districts of Kenya, located in the Rift 
Valley Province. The city of Eldoret is its capital, administrative centre and 
commercial centre. There has been a large population of white immigrants from 
England, Scotland, South Africa and Zimbabwe, who have come to settle and farm at 
different historical periods. At the beginning of the colonial era, the area was occupied 
by the Nandi sub-tribe of the Kalenjin, before that by the Maasai and before that the 
Sirikwa. Between 1960 and 1980 settlement schemes introduced by the Kenyan state 
emerged in several phases in Uasin Gishu District. The settlers were a mixture of 
Kalenjin, Kikuyu and some Luhya landless, and a few wealthier purchasers, often with 
larger holdings, who were expected to serve as an examples of ‘best farming practice’ 
to their less experienced and under-capitalised neighbours. By the late 1980s, Uasin 
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Gishu had around 30 schemes, with more than 7,500 plots, covering approximately 
16% of the district’s rural land area, and providing homes for around 60,500 people 
(Anderson and Lochery 2008:9). The province is multi-ethnic, with Kalenjins and 
Kikuyus making up the majority of the inhabitants. The province was hit hard by the 
post-election violence after the 2007 general elections. 
 
The short time (nine months) between the post-election violence and my fieldwork 
means that people remembered the recent events very well. The post-election violence 
has made Kenyans more aware of the tense political situation, and many have reflected 
on their voting behaviour in relation to these events. This, however, might have made 
people more careful when speaking about ethnicity. We must be aware that people that 
have been a part of the post-election violence will be influenced by their position in 
the recent conflict and that the informants will be coloured by their experiences. 
  
Although the country was generally calm during the period of my stay, the underlying 
conflict issues were far from finding any solution, and the political situation remained 
tense. The fieldwork thus gave me an opportunity to look closely into a continuing 
conflict which embodies the issues that explain the larger part of the electoral 
behaviour in Kenya. 
4.2.3 Data Collection 
The data collected during my fieldwork consist of interviews as well as primary and 
secondary sources such as maps and settlements patterns, newspaper articles, books, 
and academic articles. There was also an element of direct observation, especially 
connected to the homes and the neighbourhood where I conducted the interviews in 
Korogocho, and to some extent in the IDP camps and homes I visited in Uasin Gishu. 
In Uasin Gishu I was able to observe how peoples’ lives were affected by the crisis 
and the strategies they used to survive. My friend and assistant in Korogocho made me 
hang around in Korogocho also when I was not conducting interviews. In doing that I 
was able to listen to and observe people’s reactions to everyday events and discussions 
about the political situation. My presence as a foreigner and a student naturally 
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influenced these situations to a certain extent, but the people I stayed with got used to 
my presence and did not change their behaviour significantly, as far as I could judge. 
Language barriers posed a problem to direct observation. Although the youths in 
Korogocho to a certain degree speak English, most of their chat goes on in Kiswahili 
or Cheng; a mixture of the two. Although I was mostly able to pick up pieces of the 
discussion that made it understandable, thoroughly following a discussion when 
people speak Cheng is difficult. 
 
Primary sources consist of official documentation and maps of settlement patterns in 
Uasin Gishu, interviews and direct observation.  
 
Secondary sources include, among others, analyses of the political developments in 
Kenya and other relevant historical accounts of the country. Further, literature on 
political crises and civil war; state - society relations in Africa; ethnicity, clientelism 
and nationalism, is discussed. 
 
Altogether 20 interviews were conducted. The people I interviewed included ordinary 
Kenyans; women and men, young and old, Christians and Muslims, well educated and 
those with minimal education, and six different ethnic groups (Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Luo, 
Luhya, Kamba and Somali). The interviews were essential to accessing critical 
information of events that were not yet well documented in written sources, and to 
confirming information from other sources. But above all, they were useful for a 
thorough understanding of the voting patterns and the argumentation used by the 
different parties about the reasons underlying their political voting behaviour. The 
interviews were of a semi-structured type. An interview guide with 30 questions was 
prepared before the fieldwork, and worked as a “checklist” for me to know what 
questions I needed the informants to answer. However, I usually started out by asking 
quite open questions to give the informants the opportunity to elaborate on the issues 
that were important to them. Usually, it was not necessary for me to ask all the 
questions, many of them were in fact answered before I had had the time to ask. In 
some instances I also gave priority to additional information that I could get from 
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listening to what the informants wanted to talk about rather than to follow my guide 
strictly. However, I made sure to guide the conversation so that the major questions 
were answered.  
 
In addition to the interviews I also organised one focus group discussion in Eldoret, 
with seven participants between 23 to 39 years. The group consisted of four Kalenjins 
and three Kikuyus. As the focus group session was organised at the end of my field 
work in Uasin Gishu I was able to use the forum to test some of the typical responses 
from my interviews in an open discussion. It was interesting to observe how direct and 
honest the participants were when we confronted the issues of ethnic grudges and 
tensions between the two groups. The focus group acted as a supplement to the 
interviews and gave me a deeper understanding of the sentiments and rationales 
connected to electoral behaviour in Uasin Gishu. 
 
I used a digital recorder for about one-third of the interviews. This gave me the chance 
to concentrate on the conversation, and I did not get the impression that it disturbed the 
informant. They spoke freely and I was surprised how open my informants were in all 
the interviews. When the recorder was not used, it was either because there was too 
much noise in the environment or the interviews were translated. Half of my 
interviews were translated. As my informants were mostly ordinary, the education 
level varied and many did not speak English well enough. Translation was therefore 
needed. I used four different translators, and in all but one interview the understanding 
and translation was satisfactory. One incident occurred in an IDP camp in Burnt 
Forrest, Uasin Gishu District, where a local resident who spoke English insisted on 
translating for me. Showing respect and meeting their wishes was important, since I 
was not paying anything for their time and effort. The local translator spoke high-
quality English, but was so eager that he himself answered many of the questions at 
the same time as he translated what the informant had said. This gave me more 
information, but also made me suspicious of what he really communicated to the 
informant. His influence on the situation made me question whether he translated his 
own or the informants’ thoughts on the different subjects. The other translators were 
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well informed socially and politically, and understood both my research topic and how 
the interviews were going to be conducted. Two of them were my research assistants 
in Uasin Gishu and Korogocho respectively, and the last one was a relative of my 
research assistant in Korogocho. We had good communication among ourselves and I 
felt confident that they translated the questions the way I meant to ask them, although 
some nuances in some of the answers probably got lost. Having them join the 
interviews, however, also helped create a friendly atmosphere, which benefited the 
interview. On the whole I was pleased with the interviews I made with a translator. 
 
Two contacts worked as research assistants during my fieldwork, one in Korogocho 
and one in Uasin Gishu. They helped me set up my interview appointments after I had 
given them criteria to identify the informants. They were a crucial resource during my 
fieldwork. It would hardly have been possible without them. As mentioned, in some 
instances they also acted as the translators.  
 
There are two major methodogical problems with the use of research assistants. 
Firstly, they choose interviewees, which obviously gave them considerable power. 
However, I was clear on the selection criteria, and they both complied fully with my 
wishes. Sometimes they had suggestions on perspectives I might have missed and 
suggested persons who could give this perspective. I listened to them on some 
occasions and not in others. Secondly, I often discussed the interviews with them 
afterwards, opening the possibility that my impressions were coloured by my 
background. In cases where my research assistants participated in the interviews, there 
is a possibility that their presence may have influenced the informant. Yet, it did not 
feel as if it coloured their answers particularly much. I was on several occasions 
positively surprised about my informants’ openness when it came to sensitive 
information. 
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4.3 Methodological limitations 
The relationship between electoral behavior, ethnic affiliation and economic well-
being has been given relatively little attention, and the aim of this thesis is thus to 
explore this relationship. This does not mean that I expect to find one single answer to 
the question why Kenyans vote the way they do. Neither will our analysis allow us to 
comparatively measure the effect of ethnic affiliation and economic well-being on 
electoral behaviour against other factors. Rather, it is an attempt at shedding light on 
the intricate interconnections between economic well-being and socio-economic 
interests and ethnic rationales and identities with regards to electoral behaviour.  
While this thesis will shed light on the impact of economic well-being and perceptions 
of marginalisation on voting behaviour, I do not purport to claim that economic values 
is the only relevant political cleavage when Kenyans decide how to vote. I will 
therefore go through some of the familiar rational choice theories in electoral 
behaviour research to try to sort those that influence voting behaviour from those that 
do not. 
Because of my relatively limited sample (20 interviews plus one focus group 
discussion with seven people), my conclusions need further research to support wider 
generalisation. I will nonetheless argue that my selection of respondents has been done 
with careful regard to including different age groups and ethnic identities, ensuring a 
gender balance, and covering both urban and rural population groups to give a 
modicum of a representative reflection of Kenyan voting behaviour. 
The thesis, therefore, will give indications on how the relationship between ethnicity, 
economic well-being and electoral behaviour unfolds in the minds of Kenyans. It will 
hopefully give insight on interpretations of Kenyan voting behaviour that can be 
helpful in further research of Kenyan politics.  
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Chapter 5 - Analysis  
 
In Chapter 2 I showed the demographic developments of Kenyan settlement schemes 
and described the increasing political tensions in Kenya in the 1990s, manifested in 
violent disputes around the elections in 1992, 1997 and again in 2008. The political 
elites used ethnic ties to politicise rights such as access to land, and the deregulation of 
state power led to stronger ethnic divisions in the Kenyan population, which became 
particularly visible around a national election. 
 
While the first section in this chapter is similar to most analyses of Kenya which focus 
on historical tensions between ethnic groups and personal political tactics and power 
struggles, the next section will look at what might be seen as rational electoral 
behaviour for any individual and in so doing try to explain, on the basis of interviews, 
why ethnicity might be seen as an epiphenomenon when Kenyans decide how to vote. 
 
The discussion is organised around the theoretical perspectives presented in Chapter 3, 
but in this chapter I will revise the sequence and start with the different approaches to 
ethnicity followed by the different approaches to electoral behaviour. 
 
5.1 Ethnic divisions 
Difficult relationships between population groups are not new to Kenya. From the 
dawn of independence the different ethnic groups have quarrelled about access to land 
and state resources (see Chapter 2). Some scholars argue that ethnic identities and the 
history of ethnic antagonism that characterise Kenyan society are key factors in 
understanding the current political situation. Jeffrey Steeves (2006:197), for instance, 
states when writing about Kenya that “the individual in Africa is defined by one’s 
ethnic community and thus one’s loyalty and actions are framed within an ethnic 
identity. Given the ethno-regional character of African countries, political leadership is 
bounded by and serves the ethnic community”. 
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Explanations that use ethnic or other family-based identities as the starting point for 
understanding social phenomena characterise the primordialist school. A primordialist 
view holds that conflicts between groups are the result of antagonisms that are based 
on ethnic affiliation and have been built up over the years.  
 
Conflicts over land in the former white highlands in Kenya are often described by old 
antagonisms between groups. However, Gabrielle Lynch brings our attention to the 
relevance of common perceptions of how political representation and redistribution 
actually works in Kenya. Based on her studies of the land issue in the Rift Valley and 
Western Provinces (e.g. the Mt. Elgon area), she reveals that processes of ethnic 
negotiation and renegotiation in Kenya are ultimately fuelled by the desire to stake 
claims to and access resources controlled by the Kenyan state and external agents 
(Lynch 2006:49). 
 
Lynch views ethnicities as complex and contested social constructions, ‘in an endless 
process of transformation’. Her essay “Negotiating ethnicity” (2006) reveals the ways 
in which ethnic boundaries, their relevant contents, allies and members are actually 
contested and negotiated in Kenya today. Revealing not only how ethnicities may 
evolve, she also shows how individuals and communities can, within limits, choose 
their ethnic identity, relevant ethnic history, and ethnic allies. This approach and the 
documentation advanced by Lynch poses a problem for a primordialist understanding 
which would see identity as a given, not as subject to influence from institutional or 
other factors. 
5.1.1 Elite manipulation and the politicisation of ethnicity 
While purely primordialist perspectives on ethnicity are rare in contemporary debates 
concerning the Kenyan society, analyses that lie close to instrumentalist perspectives 
are more widespread. In fact, instrumentalist perspectives on ethnicity seem to fit very 
well with the predominant analyses of the political situation in Kenya, focusing on 
manipulations of identity by the elite. According to an instrumentalist view on 
ethnicity, ethnic conflict appears when political leaders see it to be in their interest to 
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amplify ethnic sentiments. Ethnicity has in Kenya already during colonial times played 
a role in the political formation of the country. The colonial powers created tension 
between different ethnic tribes in the transition from colony to independence when 
introducing settlement schemes such as Olenguruone which mostly benefited the 
Kikuyu, and again through the introduction of the concept of ‘willing seller – willing 
buyer’ in the process of returning some of the land previously owned by the white 
settlers to Kenyans (Kimenyi and Ndugu 2005; Rosenberg and Nottingham 1996).  
 
After independence, the three presidents – Jomo Kenyatta, Daniel arap Moi, and Mwai 
Kibaki – have all used ethnopolitics as a political strategy during their time in office. 
Ethnic sentiments have been played upon especially during the run up to political 
elections, which in three instances has ended with severe political violence (1992, 
1997 and 2008). Although both Kenyatta and Moi very consciously ensured that 
representatives of all ethnic groups were integrated in the political system, ethnic 
affiliation still played a role in the highly personalised political management of the 
country and thus always held a potential for politicisation. 
 
President Jomo Kenyatta used both the carrot and the stick to maintain power. He used 
land and civil service jobs to buy loyalty while opposition parties were subjected to 
political harassment. Those individuals who refused to support the status quo 
experienced various types of repression and even detention without trial (Waki report 
2008:24). To protect the large properties accumulated by collaborators with the 
colonial regime and members of the establishment in the Central Province, Kenyatta 
decided to resettle the Kikuyu landless poor and Mau Mau supporters on Kalenjin land 
in the Rift Valley. With this move he favoured his own ethnic group and gave them a 
head start in economic development (ICG report 2008:13). 
 
According to Crawford (1998), resource scarcity may tempt the political elite to 
privilege particular groups because they no longer can afford to uphold general welfare 
policies and because patronage networks as allocative mechanisms require few 
transaction costs (Crawford 1998:25). Diminishing resources would hence lead to 
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increasing patronage which was the case during Moi’s presidency from 1978 until 
2002. Daniel arap Moi became more draconian than his predecessor. First of all, 
President Moi did not start off with the same amount of resources (e.g. land, civil 
service jobs, and a buoyant coffee industry) as was available to Kenyatta to reward his 
supporters and the general public. Secondly, in 1982, Moi experienced an attempted 
coup d'état against his presidency (Waki report 2008:25). President Moi’s actions were 
designed to destroy the economic base of his opponents and to bolster his own position 
and that of his supporters, who were mainly drawn from his KAMATUSA (Kalenjin, 
Masaii, Turkana and Sambura) allies from the marginal areas (Ibid.). During election 
periods, a pattern had been established of groups forming and using extra-state 
violence with impunity against specific tribes in certain areas to obtain political power. 
Gangs and militias continued to proliferate all over the country, thereby increasing the 
presence of institutionalised extra-state violence both during and after elections, a 
pattern that was reinforced up until and through the 2007 elections, even after 
President Mwai Kibaki took over power in 2002 (Waki report 2008:27). 
 
The deliberate personalisation of presidential power made the politicisation of 
ethnicity and use of state violence possible. The Waki report from 2008 was the end 
result of the Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence (CIPEV). The 
work done by this independent commission was funded by both the Government of 
Kenya and the multi donor Trust Fund for National Dialogue and Reconciliation, 
managed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). A huge apparatus 
of field visits and hearings across Kenya provided the foundation of the Commission 
which was mandated to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
violence around the 2007 elections. The report explains how power has been 
personalised around the presidency and that this has been increased through changes in 
the Constitution under each president since independence. Laws were routinely passed 
to increase executive authority. Between 1963 and 1991, the Constitution had been 
amended 32 times (Waki Report 2008:23). Even following the election of Kibaki in 
2002 rules were ignored by ministries, underscoring the fact that the personal power of 
the President and his close associates trumped the law. Individuals in various parts of 
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government, whether in the civil service, the judiciary, and even in parliament, 
understood that, irrespective of the laws, the executive arm of government determines 
what happens. Hence, the state is not seen as neutral but as the preserve of those in 
power (Waki Report 2008:24). On the part of the public this means that given the 
power of the President and the political class everything flows not from laws but from 
the President’s power and personal decisions. This also led the public to believe a 
person from their own tribe must be in power, both to secure for them benefits and as a 
defensive strategy to keep other ethnic groups, should these take over power, from 
taking jobs, land and entitlements (Ibid). 
 
There is a common understanding from my respondents that the state is in no way 
neutral. In fact, all my respondents stated that people are treated unequally in 
encounters with the state apparatus. There is furthermore a general distrust in 
politicians that is also echoed by all the respondents. Politicians are perceived as a 
separate political class and the clear sentiment expressed is that nobody in this political 
class, no matter what ethnic group they belong to, are trustworthy. Repeatedly, 
disillusionment is articulated, as many states that they have lost hope in politics all 
together. All interviewees, across the board, contribute to painting a picture of a 
political environment where most Kenyans do not believe that politicians can make 
any change for others than themselves. The statement below is typical of the kind of 
responses given:  
 
“I do not trust politicians, they are all the same. They just want to eat for 
themselves, they don’t think about us, the people”  
– (interview) Luhya man, 22 years, Korogocho 
 
 
Even though this criticism applies to all politicians, independent of ethnic belonging, 
there seems to be a common belief that at the end of the day it is nevertheless safer to 
vote for somebody from your own ethnic group. The rational seems to be that if there 
somehow should be the slightest possibility for you to get a job or to be granted a loan, 
it would have to be in a situation where your own ethnic group has power over state 
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resources. I found that the older generation of Kenyans would much easier admit to 
voting for people from their own ethnic groups than the rest of the population. Among 
my respondents four were in the 60+ age group and in addition I had informal 
discussions with several others in the same age group. All of these were very blunt 
about the rationale behind their voting and gave similar statements to the effect that 
they voted for people from their own ethnic group in parliamentary elections, and 
furthermore that they in presidential elections voted for the person their ethnic leader 
supported. The reasons they offered were in part that this was how it had always been, 
and that they believed it would somehow bring benefits in one form or another.  
 
“It is easier to get benefits from your own tribe because we understand each 
other better” 
- (interview) Kikuyu woman, 62 years, Uasin Gishu 
 
“I voted for Raila because he is from the same tribe as me, maybe I will get 
benefits” 
- (interview) Luo man, 79 years, Korogocho 
 
The rest of my respondents, who in interviews stated that they voted for people from 
the same ethnic group as themselves, gave other reasons than tribal ones for voting the 
way they did. Strikingly, many respondents contradicted themselves when first stating 
that they did not trust any politicians, while later in the interview stating that they 
where very satisfied with some politicians from their own tribe. The impression 
conveyed indicates that voting along ethnic lines according to ethnic rationales is 
something Kenyans would be reluctant to admit, but ultimately end up doing. It must 
be added, however, that while they gave reasons that could be interpreted as being 
ethnic, most respondents argued politically and had no problems giving specific 
political reasons for voting as they did, either for a candidate or a party. This quote 
from a Kikuyu woman is a good example of the kind of responses I got when I asked 
about how and why individuals voted the way they did: 
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“Politicians are all the same, they all give us promises but they don’t do 
anything (….) I voted Kibaki because I am satisfied with what he has done, 
especially with education and property rights (…) We (Kikuyu) like to own 
things. I like to say this is mine” 
- Kikuyu woman, 45 years, Korogocho 
 
It further appears that perceptions of marginalisation are also playing a key role for a 
substantial segment of voters, and that such perceptions of marginalisation have been 
strengthened within certain ethnic communities, while not being equally prevalent 
among others. When giving reasons for their voting, individuals in ethnic groups that 
typically expressed feelings of marginalisation often stated that they believed the 
candidate they voted for would provide a fairer distribution of the benefits of growth. 
In my research I found that the sense of ethnic belonging is stronger among the 
Kalenjin, the Luo and the Kikuyu, while the perception of being increasingly 
marginalised is stronger among the Kalenjins and the Luo who feel betrayed and 
marginalised by the Kikuyu in power during the decades following the independence.  
 
Apart from the Luo and the Kalenjin, members of other ethnic communities also 
expresses a feeling of marginalisation, and a perception that the Kikuyu historically 
have benefited disproportionately both with regards to monetary and material wealth 
and with regards to political power. Still, I never experienced the feeling of “personal” 
betrayal to be as strong in interviews with other ethnic communities as with the Luo 
and the Kalenjin. However, this does not necessarily imply that such perceptions of 
marginalisation are exclusive to the Luo and the Kalenjin. Based on shorter visits to 
Lamu District, I believe there is reason to assume that further research along these 
same lines in the coastal areas of Lamu and Tana Districts would reveal similar 
sentiments of betrayal and marginalisation. Here, settlement schemes such as the Lake 
Kenyatta settlement scheme have moved a great number of mainly Kikuyu into native 
Mijikenda land. 
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Members of the ethnic community that has most clearly benefited from the post-
independent patterns of resource allocation, the Kikuyu, often stated political reasons 
for their electoral behaviour and overwhelmingly placed emphasis on securing 
property rights and on less redistributionist policies. This was the case even though 
they personally had not been in a position where they benefited directly from post-
independent policies. These ideologically rightist points of view are mirrored by a 
somehow opposite stand among mainly the Luo who harboured typically leftists 
attitudes as a common denominator. A certain political aspect thus seems to have 
become embodied in the ethnic stereotypes that are so influential in Kenyan politics. 
These politicised ethnic stereotypes and identities are making its mark on Kenyan 
electoral behaviour. I address this further when I return to the issue of ideology.  
 
It is should perhaps be reiterated at this point that it is not always the case that 
Kenyans vote for people from their own tribe. Nor is the reason for such an electoral 
decision necessarily related to the prospect of personal benefit. Of the twenty people I 
interviewed, seven voted for an MP with an ethnic background different from their 
own, and four voted for a presidential candidate that was not supported by leading 
politicians from their own tribe. I will elaborate on this below.  
5.1.2 Politicisation of ethnicity; summed up   
Instrumental perspectives on ethnicity can be useful in highlighting how identities 
related to ethnicity have been tactically used and manipulated for the purposes of 
personal and political gain. An important contribution of the instrumentalist school is 
the recognition that ethnic identity is not naturally given but rather formed by 
historical and political processes, such as conflict over land and discussion over the 
constitutional dispensation. 
 
President Kenyatta increasingly favoured his ethnic group, the Kikuyu, in matters of 
land distribution. He also secured a centralised form of state which kept him in control 
of state resources. Moi did nothing to alter the established patterns of a ‘distorted’ 
distribution of land when he took office. He increased the powers of the Presidency 
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even beyond the levels of Kenyatta’s and he maintained the centralised state intact. At 
the same time Moi gave preferential treatment to his own ethnic group, the Kalenjin, 
and those closely related, the KAMATUSA, in matters of employment and local 
improvement. Kibaki campaigned with the promise of giving the country a new 
constitution within 100 days of his new administration. When in power, he changed 
the ‘Bomas draft’ to retain the powerful Presidency and the strong centralised state.  
 
These developments led Kenyans in general to lose faith in a neutral state and to a 
certain extent in politicians altogether. The concentration of power around the 
president, however, made many Kenyans believe that people from their own ethnic 
group have to be in power in order both to secure benefits and as a defensive strategy 
to keep other ethnic groups, should these take over power, from taking jobs, land and 
entitlements. 
 
The shortcoming of instrumentalist perspectives, however, is that they tend to ignore 
the importance of identities other than ethnic identities, and hence to underestimate the 
effect that economic and other political factors may have on individuals when deciding 
to vote, independently of ethnicity.  
 
Section 5.2 shows how rational electoral behaviour for any individual may have other 
sources than ethnicity. I will discuss different rationales from section 3.1 and try to 
explain why ethnicity might be seen as an epiphenomenon when Kenyans decide how 
to vote. 
 
5.2 Social cleavages – ethnicity, religion and class 
5.2.1 Ethnicity 
The fact that the social position of a voter correlates with his or her party choice is one 
of the most long lasting and well documented facts in research on electoral behaviour 
(Oskarson 2005:84). The idea originated from the political-sociological approach of 
Lipset and Rokkan that electoral choices are based on a limited number of social 
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cleavages. The argument is that if you belong to a certain segment of the society and 
there is a political party representing that particular segment of society, you are likely 
to vote for that party. In the Kenyan setting, chapter two showed that the most 
prominent and operational social cleavages have been and still are those between 
ethnic groups. Social class could also be a factor, but the political parties have focused 
on drawing support more from ethnic groups rather than social classes. This 
perspective implies that the importance of social cleavages for party choice does not 
only depend on the nature and strength of the cleavages, but also on how the parties 
relate to the cleavage. In other words, if there is no party that could be perceived as 
representing a certain group better than other parties, it is less likely that the group will 
vote according to a coherent pattern. Cleavage voting refers to the interaction between 
socio-structural groups and political parties (Oskarson 2005:85). Using Lipset’s and 
Rokkan’s argument would suggest that in Kenya the voters would have a tendency to 
vote for the party representing their ethnic group preferences best. In the previous 
section I made the point that this is the case for a great number of Kenyans, especially 
with the older generation. The political parties and their leaders have used ethnicity as 
a motivating factor to obtain support, and during the multiparty era, ethnic 
communities have tended to support their ‘own’ political parties or ‘alliances’. Party 
differences and competition have been reinforced by ethnic cleavages and stereotypes 
(Andreassen et al. 2008:7). 
5.2.2 Religion 
Kenya’s population comprises several religious groups, whereof approximately 80% 
are Christians and 10-20% Muslims (Oded 2000:1). In the coastal areas the Muslim 
segment accounts for more than 50% of the population. In the north of Kenya, most of 
the residents are Somalis, which is an almost exclusively Muslim population group. 
There are also a considerable number of Muslims in the large towns, including 
Nairobi, Nakuru, Kisumu and Eldoret. In the western part of the country there are 
concentrations of Muslims in Mumias and Homa Bay (Oded :200:12). Religion could 
therefore serve as a significant social cleavage if there were parties actually 
representing Christians and Muslims interests separately. In the Kenyan setting, 
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however, this has not been the case. The Kenyan government, like the governments of 
Uganda and Tanzania and other East African countries, prohibited the formation of 
political parties based on religion (Oded 2000:21). It could be suggested that 
prominent politicians like Najib Balala representing the Coast in Kenyan politics, is 
not just a representative of a particular tribe (Mijikenda), but may indeed also 
represent the Muslim community as such. There was, however, no support for this sort 
of assertion among neither the Muslims I talked to informally nor the two Muslims I 
interviewed in Korogocho. Although they all placed religion above ethnicity as an 
identity marker, with respect to the question of marriage, none of the Muslims in 
Korogocho felt loyal towards fellow Muslims from the Coastal Province. The reasons 
for their electoral choice were focused on other aspects.   
5.2.3 Class 
Economic class, which has been the dominant social determinant in European electoral 
behaviour, has not had the same effect on political party systems in Africa, in this case 
Kenya. The huge differentials of income have not manifested themselves in political 
parties. Instead, inequalities in the distribution of resources and access to the state have 
been connected to interethnic inequalities by political entrepreneurs who have had an 
interest in mobilising ethnicity to gain political support, just as Rothschild (1981) 
describes. Based on similar experiences from the typical European setting, the 
economic decline and increasing level of poverty in Kenya in the 1980s and 1990s 
could easily have had a potential for influencing political events and outcomes. 
Economic class could have been used as mobilising basis of socials movements 
lobbying for job opportunities, real wages increments and fair distribution of land. 
This never happened. A possible explanation might be found in what is outlined in this 
chapter as the link between political preferences and ethnic identities (see Value 
Orientations and Ideology).   
 
All in all, we can conclude that class and religious voting is of minor importance in 
Kenyan society. Ethnic voting, by contrast, does play a role in Kenyan electoral 
behaviour. My argument is that political parties in Kenya also represent other 
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cleavages apart from ethnicity. Certain issues, such as the devolution of power 
(majimboism) and the role and powers of the presidency, have been important for 
different parties, and although economic class has not been used directly to mobilise 
voters, inequalities in the distribution of land and resources have been and still are 
major issues in Kenyan politics. 
 
5.3 Long-term predispositions  
5.3.1 Party identification – KANU 
Social roots are not the only possible basis for enduring party preference. In the 
Michigan tradition of electoral research, party identification had the function of 
ensuring people’s lasting attachment to a political party (Berglund et al. 2005:106). 
The historically dominant party in Kenya, KANU, held a unique position in Kenyan 
society and political life since independence. People who at an early stage believed in 
KANU’s vision and ability to make substantial changes in their lives and for the 
country, may have developed a party identification along these lines. Such an identity 
could have led many Kenyans to continue voting for the same party not based on its 
performance or its social and ethnic distinctiveness, but ‘simply’ because it was what 
they had habitually always done. 
 
In my inquiries I found this to be partially true. There are different opinions about the 
change from single-party to multi-party politics. After multi-party politics was 
reintroduced in Kenya in 1991, a majority of Kenyans remained loyal to KANU. In 
many aspects KANU succeeded in its attempt at convincing Kenyans that multi-party 
politics would lead to a more ethnically fragmented society. The violence around the 
1992 and 1997 elections were seen by many as a direct consequence of the 
reintroduction of multi-party politics. During this period Kenya was simultaneously 
experiencing economic decline which of course affected the general population, 
leading many to the conclusion that it was in fact the new era of multi-party politics 
that had destabilised Kenyan society. Looking closer at the responses from my 
interviewees who were old enough to have voted in 1992 and 1997, half of this group 
 64
remained loyal to KANU throughout the 1990s. In Korogocho I found no ethnic 
pattern in the distribution of votes between KANU and opposition parties, but in Uasin 
Gischu none of the Kikuyu voted for KANU and all except one Kalenjin voted for 
KANU in the 1990s. As explained in Chaper 2, KANU’s strategy to manipulate 
electoral support through ethno-political violence in the 1992 elections was successful 
and this is probably why the Kalenjin voted for KANU whereas the Kikuyus did not 
(Section 2.3.2, Andreassen 2003:174). Reviewing the interviews, however, the most 
common reason the Kalenjin respondents gave for voting KANU was that they knew 
the party and how things had been during their rule and were more or less satisfied. 
They were therefore sceptical to other parties which from their perspective seemed 
only interested in power. They believed that multiparty politics would mean chaos. 
This quote from a Kalenjin woman is a good example of the kind of sentiments 
expressed by those who voted for KANU throughout the 1990s:  
  
“It was better with one party; Moi was good at first, he employed people, it 
was easier to live, cheaper food. We didn’t see any change with multiparty 
politics, now everybody is just fighting.” 
    - Kalenjin woman, 50 years, Uasin Gishu 
 
At the same time, all my respondents both in Korogocho and Uasin Gishu stated that 
they had longed for more freedom of choice and freedom of speech and that they were 
jubilant about the democratic opening from single-party to multi-party politics, even 
though it took some time before the opposition managed to launch an alternative that 
all Kenyans could believe in. In the 2002 election when Moi picked Uhuru Kenyatta as 
his successor, many loyal supporters left KANU and voted for the opposition NARC. 
All my respondents, except one, claimed they voted for Kibaki and NARC in the 2002 
election. 
 
Even though KANU did indeed have a strong position in Kenyan political life after 
independence, that era has come to an end. Kenyan politics have always been driven 
by strong individual personalities, and this became more evident after the introduction 
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of multiparty politics. I saw a clear tendency in my studies that Kenyans vote for 
individuals and what they stand for, not political parties. I will come back to this later. 
A conclusion of this section must be that party identification has seen a decline in the 
Kenyan society along with the decline of the erstwhile dominant political party 
KANU. 
5.3.2 Value orientations 
“Political values are prescriptive beliefs, which individuals would like to see 
implemented in the political system, and include the forms of political participation by 
which individuals seek to influence politics” (Knutsen and Kumlin 2005:125). 
 
As explained in chapter 3, the argument made in European electoral theory is that even 
when social cleavages lose political significance, the value orientation that historically 
was a part of these social cleavages might not lose their significance. For instance, 
even though the class cleavages in Europe might lose some of the defining impact it 
once had, the value of economic “equitable distribution of income” might still be of 
great importance. The most important political value orientation in Europe has been 
left-right values or left-right materialist values. These value orientations are economic 
in nature, and they refer in particular to the role of government in creating more 
economic equality in society, on the one hand, and in providing economic incentives 
and efficiency, on the other. They incorporate value conflicts related to control, power, 
and the degree of distribution of resources in the production sphere; state regulation of 
the economy versus private enterprise; private property and market economy versus 
economic and social equality; and the need for differentiated rewards for stimulating 
effort (Knutsen and Kumlin 2005:125).  
 
Contrary to class, the social cleavage of ethnicity does not have an inherent political 
value. And contrary to politics in Europe, the most important social cleavage in 
politics in Kenya is ethnicity. This does not imply, however, that there are no value 
orientations stemming from underlying social cleavages in the case of Kenya. In 
Kenya, economic values connected to the distribution of resources and state control 
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has been at the core of electoral behaviour, economic equality and inequality are 
highly relevant to voters when deciding how to vote. And as discussed in section 4.1.1 
regarding elite manipulation and politicisation of ethnicity, I have found that political 
preferences in these matters appear to be embodied in the ethnic identities that seem so 
influential in Kenyan voting behaviour. I will discuss this further in the next section, 
when analysing the impact and importance of ideology. Here, however, I will just note 
that my analysis of the interviews I conducted indicates that instead of being tied to the 
social cleavage of class, economic values in Kenya has through historical events, to a 
certain extent, been expressed through the social cleavage of ethnicity.  
5.3.3 Ideology 
The ideological orientation is connected to the class cleavage and is traditionally 
conceived as a dichotomy between left and right. Difference between left and right are 
reflected in the twin concepts of economic equality and inequality and the role of the 
government and the market (Thomassen 2005:13). The left-right continuum has 
traditionally been looked upon in electoral research as one of the most important 
dimensions to describe voters’ substantive political orientation. In combination with 
their perception of where political issues are located on the same dimension, these 
orientations allow an instrumental mode of electoral choice (Van der Eijk et al. 
2005:167). And as said before, during the fight for independence, when African 
political systems where being shaped, the division between capitalism (right) and 
socialism (left) was at the centre of events. This was also the case in Kenya. 
 
The most used reasoning in Europe is that the social cleavage that contributed to the 
formation of the European party system, economic class, still provides meaning to the 
terms ‘left’ and ‘right’ and to voters’ individual position on the left-right continuum 
(Van der Eijk et al. 2005:168). During the fight for independence, KANU and 
Kenyatta proclaimed that they would establish a socialist state with equal distribution 
of social and economic welfare. After independence, however, the economy was 
oriented more in the direction of capitalism and foreign investment. Chapter 2 showed 
that the ideological cleavage between ‘left’ and ‘right’ manifested itself inside KANU, 
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with the Luo politician Oginga Odinga representing the socialist (left) side, and most 
of the rest of the party’s leadership including Jomo Kenyatta representing the 
conservative (right) side (Ochieng’ 1989:214-216). 
 
It is argued that the two most influential political parties in Kenya today can also be 
compared to what we in Europe would label socialist and capitalist parties. Andreassen 
et al. (2008) have made a comparative analysis of the two main contenders in the 2007 
election: the PNU led by Mwai Kibaki and the ODM led by Raila Odinga. Their 
conclusion is that the PNU and the ODM election manifestos differ in important 
respects. There is, they claim, what might be termed a left-right cleavage centred on 
distributional issues: the PNU favours growth per se, implicitly believing in the market 
and its ‘trickle down’ effect as distributive mechanisms, whereas the ODM favours 
interventionist distribution policies related to land, social services and other resources 
to ensure social justice. There is also a governance cleavage where the PNU favours a 
unitary system of government while the ODM prefers far-reaching devolution of 
decision-making authority to lower tiers of government (Andreassen et al. 2008:64). 
 
When asked about whether they had read the political manifestos of the ODM or the 
PNU nearly all respondents I talked to answered “no”. The only one who claimed he 
had read the manifestos was a well educated older man who had previously worked in 
the public service. Nevertheless, when it came to certain issues such as the devolution 
of power and the distribution of land, everybody had an opinion about the different 
parties or what their presidential candidates stood for. In some cases their perceptions 
did not match reality, but overall the interviewees indicated that they had a good 
overview and understanding of what the party and candidate they voted for actually 
represented.  
 
As I will elaborate on later, it seems to be the different leaders and individual 
personalities in the parties, and not the parties themselves, that represent and articulate 
the respective ideologies. The various politicians represent more or less the same 
political line and ideology regardless of their party affiliation. President Mwai Kibaki 
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is himself an example. As an active and visible politician in Kenyan political life ever 
since independence, Mwai Kibaki has continuously represented a right-wing or 
capitalist policy, based on a firm belief in the principles of the market economy 
coupled with support for a centralised governance system. Father and son, Oginga 
Odinga and Raila Odinga, have, on the other hand, represented a belief in a 
decentralised governance system and in interventionist distribution policies. If a given 
voter of Kikuyu origin has voted for Kibaki in every election one might, therefore, 
draw the conclusion that his electoral behaviour is based on ethnicity, or you could 
claim that he is voting based on ideological preference. Similarly, if a Luo who has 
continuously voted for the Odinga family one might make similar claims. In my 
research, I found that the Luo and Kikuyu I talked to in Korogocho, especially if the 
older generation (60+) is left out, argued politically and ideologically when asked who 
they voted for. The same was true for the youth (<40) in Eldoret, although they had a 
stronger ethnic element in their consciousness owing generally to recent experiences 
of violence. At the same time, there were a few cases of a Kalenjin or a Luo having 
voted for a Kikuyu, or a Kikuyu having voted for a Luo. In these cases the respondents 
almost always argued ideologically. 
 
“I have voted for Kibaki in all four multi-party elections (….) Raila’s father 
was a great politician, but he didn’t want anything like buying farms, he 
was a socialist so to speak, and Raila never changed from this line. Kibaki 
is a capitalist, and I would label myself a capitalist” 
- Kalenjin man, 66 years, Uasin Gishu 
 
To wrap up, I would claim on this basis that economic ideology certainly plays a role 
in the electoral behaviour of Kenyans. This might, however, at times be hard to detect 
from just looking at the mere electoral results, where statistics evidently shows that 
voting patterns significantly correlate with ethnic divisions. As historical injustices and 
perceptions of marginalisation have been strengthened among certain ethnic groups, 
ideology and ethnicity are both leading to similar voting patterns. Ethnicity thus, might 
be seen as an epiphenomenon when Kenyans decide how to vote. 
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5.3.4 Clientelism 
Clientelism is defined as transactions between politicians and citizens whereby 
material favours are offered in return for political support at the polls (Wantchekon 
2003:399).  
 
There are several variations of clientelism, but all involve a mutually beneficial 
exchange between patrons and clients. An intermediate form of clientelism involves a 
hierarchy, starting with elites who have access to government funds, these elites then 
channel funds through local intermediaries (in ethnically heterogeneous states, these 
intermediaries are often clan elders) who, in turn, distribute some of the wealth to the 
voters. This form of clientelism would not rely on direct, personal exchanges. There is 
also clientelism in personalistic forms, whereby voters expect personal or communal 
benefits directly from their elected officials (Young 2009:1). 
 
The basic premise underlying clientelistic networks is logical. Voters enjoy direct 
benefits, and upon receiving them, feel indebted to the patron (politician) and would 
be inclined to support him in the hope of receiving further benefits in the future. In his 
research of Kenyan voting behaviour, Young (2009) found that being offered a gift in 
return for a vote or being in direct contact with an MP makes little difference to the 
voters’ preference. Rather, visiting the constituency is more likely to help an 
incumbent MP’s re-election bid. Voting behaviour will thus be shaped by the voters’ 
assessment of a given MP’s dedication to the constituency. 
 
The intermediate form of clientelism seems to be of diminishing significance in 
Kenya. Although “elders” have held and still hold an important position in Kenyan 
culture, I did not find evidence that the role of elders were of significant importance 
when members of a community were deciding to vote. In my research, especially 
Kalenjin respondents stated clearly that people used to listen to the “elders” of their 
clan in political matters, including who to vote for, but that this was no longer the case. 
Although “elders” were referred to and talked about with the deepest respect and often 
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gave advice on how to vote, the predominant assertion was that people made up their 
own mind and that the advice of the “elders” was no longer critical.  
 
Moving from the intermediate to more direct forms of clientelism, the findings made 
by Young are in line with my own. With regard to parliamentary elections, voters are 
concerned with the sitting MP’s performance and what he/she has done for the 
constituency. My respondents described mechanisms whereby voters would typically 
be willing to re-elect an MP who throughout the election period continuously had been 
visiting the communities within his or her constituency. Furthermore, all my 
respondents recognised the prevalence of MPs giving personal contributions from their 
own wallet back to his constituency, such as scholarships, financial support to a 
community shelter or a church, supporting local initiatives and so forth. This form of 
clientelism is widespread in Kenya. However, the statements and response from the 
interviewees do not provide sufficient evidence to draw any firm conclusions 
regarding the impact of these practices on electoral behaviour.  
 
The relationship between political clientelism and ethnicity has often been discussed in 
political science theory. The form of clientelism discussed here does not necessarily 
occur along ethnic lines. Half of the Kikuyu respondents from Uasin Gishu reported to 
have voted for a local Kalenjin candidate in the parliamentary election although they 
voted for Kibaki – a Kikuyu – as president. The reasons they gave was similar in 
character to the argumentation above. If the sitting MP had been visiting both the 
Kalenjin and the Kikuyu community, both Kikuyu and Kalenjin would vote for him 
again. If another MP candidate had visited the community and promised to do 
something for the people living there, they might vote for him, regardless of ethnic 
identities. The decisive factor appears to be who they believed they could trust to keep 
their promises. Especially the young generation seemed to weigh the relevant 
candidates against each other and make a choice based, on trust, not ethnic identity. 
This quote is representative:    
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“I voted for Peris [Peris Chepchumba, a Kalenjin], she has been here 
and I think maybe she can make some change. She was the best 
candidate” 
- Kikuyu man, 28 years, Uasin Gischu 
 
However, my respondents added that if an MP was seen to be treating the Kikuyu and 
Kalenjin communities unequally, this could generate ethnic tensions and cause the 
community who see themselves as unfairly treated and possibly induce people or 
whole communities to favour another candidate from their own ethnic group in the 
next election.  
 
Documenting prevalence and relevance with respect to clientelism and clientelist 
practice are two different challenges. The respondents gave responses consistent with 
the findings of Young as to the prevalence of certain practises, but the feedback with 
regard to the actual impact of these practices is inconclusive. In order to determine 
what the impact of these widespread practices is on electoral behaviour in Kenya, 
more detailed research would be needed. I have in my studies researched this element 
as one of several and not been able to find a conclusive correlation. This applies as 
well the intermediary forms of clientelism: my research was too limited to form the 
basis of a firm conclusion. 
 
5.4 Short-term factors 
5.4.1 Issue voting 
According to Downs (1957) citizens use ideological orientations as yardsticks for 
developing attitudes on specific issues (Aardal and van Wijnen 2005:195).  The idea is 
that values and ideological orientations are causally preceding attitudes towards issues. 
However, election-specific issues may also have an influence in the opposite direction 
– by activating latent values or ideological orientations. There is a clear difference 
between issues and values, but in practice it can be difficult to distinguish sharply 
between them. Issues are more narrowly defined than values – capturing particular 
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policy proposals of political circumstances. A particular issue may reflect the same 
latent cleavage as a political value, thus representing deeply embedded predispositions 
(Aardal and van Wijnen 2005:195).   
 
In the Kenyan context the issues of land reform and amending the constitution have 
throughout the multi-party era been prominent during the electoral campaigns (Chitere 
et al. 2006:2). These issues also became decisive when Kenyans rejected the proposed 
new constitution in 2005, when many attributed the outcome to the discrepancies 
between the aspirations created during the 2002 elections and the substance of the 
Wako draft constitution. In particular, the extensive power of the presidency and the 
question of regional devolution (in Kenya referred to as majimbo) have been two very 
important elements of popular demand for a new constitution among Kenyans.  
 
The key element in the campaign for the Rift Valley vote in 2007 was Odinga’s 
support for constitutional change and majimboism. The notion of regional devolution 
of powers expressed in the Swahili term majimbo (meaning region) has been a feature 
of politics in the Rift Valley Province since colonial rule, but Kenyatta’s government 
swept away the majimbo constitution within a few months of taking power. The 
majimbo debate regained momentum in the early 1990s, when Moi and his supporters 
played the ethnic card in efforts to suppress political opposition in the Rift Valley, 
declaring the province a ‘KANU zone’.  Since then, a small but highly vocal and 
extremely aggressive political campaign has emerged, promoting a radical ethno-
nationalism in which majimbo is presented as the expulsion of non-indigenous peoples 
from the Rift Valley, and thus the means toward the return of all ‘ancestral lands’ to 
local Kalenjin communities (Anderson and Lochery 2008:3). In taking a pro-majimbo 
stance, Odinga did not at any point in time advocate expulsion, but he was persistently 
vague in explaining exactly what his policy might entail. The ODM’s majimbo variant 
cleverly exploited the yearning for regional autonomy among the Kalenjin, but the 
ODM did not provide details on what such a devolution would involve, and many 
Kalenjin saw majimbo as a chance to “throw off the Kikuyu yoke” (ICG 2008:13). 
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The critical importance of the phenomenon of majimboism and the political issue of 
decentralisation or devolution of power was evident among my respondents in Uasin 
Gishu District, Rift Valley. Everyone had clear opinions on majimboism, and while 
many Kalenjin said they voted as the did in order to achieve majimbo, the Kikuyu all 
expressed feelings of apprehension in relations to the term majimbo, as they believed it 
would result in ethnic cleansing and that they would hence be thrown out. This 
interpretation of the term majimbo was shared by several Kalenjin, but neither the 
higher educated nor the young Kalenjin were among them. These two segments of the 
Kalenjin respondents believed majimboism to entail a decentralisation of power and 
resources, which in consequence would mean the redistribution of resources for the 
benefit of the people residing in the provinces, i.e. a centre-periphery understanding of 
the term. They still argued in favour of majimboism, and said that most people who 
opposed it had misunderstood the concept.  
 
In the Rift Valley, the issue of majimboism clearly divides the population by ethnic 
identity and belonging. Nevertheless, the people interviewed who shared an 
interpretation of majimboism as the redistribution of resources through decentralisation 
rather than ethnic cleansing in any form, clearly associated majimboism with the 
political value of economic equality and further to the ideological left side of politics.  
 
In Korogocho, majimboism did not seem to have the same influence on voting 
behaviour as in the Rift Valley, even though most people were familiar with the term. 
But even if majimboism was of far lesser significance, it was evident that the response 
pattern was much the same as in Uasin Gishu. The Kikuyu were against the 
introduction of majimboism, regardless of the interpretation of the term. All the other 
respondents were in favour of majimboism, but interestingly they all based their 
support on an understanding that majimboism was interpreted as decentralisation; and 
all were against the term if it were interpreted as meaning the ethnic cleansing of the 
regions.   
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The results of my research suggest that even though majimboism was extensively used 
by political entrepreneurs to create ethnic tension, the issue is itself political and is also 
widely understood as political. Based on this I would suggest that attitudes towards 
majimboism as a political issue can be placed along the left-right continuum; if you 
vote for the introduction of majimboism you can with reasonable accuracy be placed 
on the left side, while being against it would associate a voter with the right. 
 
Integration 
In a focus group session with seven Kalenjin and Kikuyu participants from Uasin 
Gishu District in the age group from 23 to 39 years, it became very apparent that 
integration is a serious challenge. The Kalenjin expressed a common attitude towards 
the Kikuyu population to the effect that the Kikuyu who live in the district ought to be 
more like themselves. The perception of the Kikuyu as ‘proud and aggressive 
businessmen’ who do not want to integrate into the Kalenjin community comes across 
as a common point of view. The following quote is a statement typical of the 
sentiments expressed by the Kalenjin focus group participants in Uasin Gishu: 
 
“If they (the Kikuyu) had been voting with us and lived with us, we would have 
accepted them, but since they do not – we don’t want them here” 
- Kalenjin woman, 32 years, Uasin Gishu  
 
It resurfaced in every conversation I had with Kalenjin in Uasin Gishu that the Kikuyu 
tended to rename places they moved into. All the areas where the Kikuyu live had 
been renamed and given Kikuyu names from Central Province where the Kikuyu 
originate. The fact that this issue kept resurfacing served to highlight its symbolic 
significance, and as something from which people is drawing generalised conclusions 
and attitudes. Many emphasised how this practise was not the case in the places where 
the Luhya had settled; they had kept the original Kalenjin names. In several separate 
interviews parallels were drawn from this symbolic single issue to the broader 
perception of the Luhya as a much more integrated settler minority in the local 
community.  
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In the focus group, the Kikuyu on their part agreed that they as a group characteristic 
were both proud and good business men, but they did differ in their own view on their 
willingness and ability to integrate; claiming that they wanted to be a part of the local 
community. They all stated that they felt threatened by the Kalenjin and that they did 
not feel wanted. They furthermore expressed the feeling that tension and insecurity 
were the reasons why they were voting for the Kikuyu, especially in the presidential 
election. The rationale they presented was a belief that people from their own ethnic 
origin would provide security and safeguard their interests. In connection with the 
recent violence, the Kikuyu were all disappointed, however, with Kibaki whom they 
thought had neglected them and reacted too late. Despite of the differing perceptions 
of each others’ intentions and attitudes, there was a very clear and common belief 
among all the focus group participants that the recent events had somehow brought 
them closer together as a community because they now all want to live in peace with 
each other in order to make sure the strife would not happen again.  
 
Intermarriage 
At the end of all my interviews and in the focus group discussion I brought up the 
issue of the possible effects of intermarriage with regard to integration, relationships 
between ethnic groups and voting behaviour. The response was unambiguous. The 
focus group claimed there would be much more intermarriages in the future, which 
would inevitably tie the different ethnic groups closer together, even on political 
questions. This was the common understanding by everybody I talked to. I only 
conducted one interview in Uasin Gishu with someone who was living in an ethnically 
mixed marriage, but everyone I interviewed either had close relatives or good friends 
who were living in similar unions. In Korogocho, I interviewed two individuals who 
were married with someone from another ethnic group, but the remaining respondents 
all had close friends who were living in intermarriages, or had themselves been in a 
relationship with someone from another ethnic group. The ones I interviewed currently 
living in intermarriages were all under 40 years old, and the other youths I interviewed 
were more relaxed and open-minded with respect to marriage or relationships across 
ethnic divisions. They all stated they would have no problem marrying someone from 
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another ethnic group; it was rather all about who they fell in love with. At the same 
time, they all admitted that their parents probably would be more at ease if they 
married someone from their own ethnic group. 
 
I interviewed two women and one man who lived in mixed marriages and in all three 
instances the woman in the relationship voted for the preferred presidential candidate 
of the husband. In the case of elections for MPs the two women I interviewed both 
voted for the same candidate as their husband, but the man I interviewed did not know 
for whom his wife had voted as an MP. Both female interviewees stated that the 
husband had managed to influence them to vote the way they did, but that his 
arguments had been political and they really believed that the President and MP they 
voted for was the best candidate for the country. This is what one of my respondent 
answered when I asked who she had voted for, and if she thought she had been 
influenced by her Luo husband: 
 
“I voted for Raila cause I was tired of this Kibaki person. I voted to get him 
out. I wanted to see what Raila could do for us, I wanted to see change (….) 
I was probably influenced by my husband - I would say yes. You know, 
when I listened to my other relatives, how they spoke about Raila, it didn’t 
make sense to me. I think they spoke badly of him because he is from the 
Luo community. I don’t think they have really sat down and thought about 
how he is different from Kibaki and what he can offer to us.”  
- Kikuyu woman, 27 years, Korogocho 
 
The respondent further explained, when I asked about her friends and people in her 
own generation, that she had told all her friends whom she was voting for and that they 
had no problem with her decision. She had many other friends who lived in 
intermarriages and she believed that it would become more and more normal to do so. 
Her perception was that young people do not think about ethnicity when it comes to 
friends and boyfriends. “It seems like it only matters around an election – but this will 
change with time because eventually we all will be married to each other” she added, 
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with a smile. Interestingly, her statements correlate with those from the other 
respondents in her age group. When including the focus group (7 people), I conducted 
in total 15 interviews with youths in the -40 age group. The perception conveyed by 
the younger respondent was in this regard very clear, as they were all convinced that 
there would be a substantial growth in intermarriages and that this would be positive 
for Kenya and contribute to reducing the impact of ethnicity in politics. 
5.4.2 Retrospective voting 
Economics is by far the dominant dimension for the study of retrospective voting. 
Retrospective voting presupposes that voters are assessing the past performance and 
the future prospects of the government and the President in office against their self-
interest. Retrospective voting theory puts a stronger emphasis on the individual citizen 
as an actor, often with independence from parties and other collective structures and 
bonds of loyalty (Listhaug 2005:213). The economy is important for electoral choices, 
and movement in the economy has important economic effects: growth, 
unemployment, inflation. Negative evaluations on the economy thus hurt the electoral 
fortunes of incumbent parties (Listhaug 2005: 215). 
 
In Kenya, many of my respondents used an argumentation that could be interpreted as 
retrospective voting, stating that they voted for the incumbent President because he has 
done well with regard education and general welfare, or that they voted for the 
opposition because they were not satisfied with the way the incumbent had done his 
job with respect to, for instance, a new constitution or corruption. 
 
In Korogocho I found something interesting in this respect as far as the parliamentary 
elections were concerned. When asked about the former MP, a male Luo politician, 
and how they thought he had done while in parliament, everybody, regardless of ethnic 
identities, age or sex, stated that they were dissatisfied and complained that he only 
“ate for himself”. None of my ten respondents had voted for him again in the 2007 
elections because of his unsatisfactory past performance, even though he ran for re-
election. The newly elected MP in this constituency (Kasarani) is a Luo woman. 
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Almost everybody I asked, and all the youths, were pleased with her performance so 
far. After being elected she had already (September 2008) been visiting Korogocho 
and the perception of the voters was that the new MP had plans for developing the 
slum area. When asked if they would vote for her again, everybody, again regardless 
of ethnic identity, said that if she really did what she had so far signalled and they 
experienced change for the better in Korogocho in forms of better sanitation, 
electricity, less crime, etc., they would definitely vote for her at the next election. This 
kind of electoral rationales constitutes a form of retrospective voting, and can be 
interpreted as a clear indication of an electoral environment where a politician is 
assessed in terms of performance. If the voters actually see change for the better they 
would continue voting for this person independently of their ethnic belonging. 
Economic factors or other welfare-related factors seem to surpass ethnic affiliation as 
motivation when deciding how to vote, especially at the parliamentary level. These 
mechanisms would of course have to be researched thoroughly in order to draw a final 
conclusion, but I find it interesting that ethnic belonging in this specific setting seemed 
to be totally irrelevant to my respondents.  
 
The people I talked to in Kasarani constituency had not seen or felt any change for the 
better during the last couple of electoral periods and expressed disillusionment with 
politicians and their promises. Their statements suggest a rationale that they might as 
well vote for politicians from their own ethnic group because they at least feel 
connected through a common history and culture. A possible extension of this 
argument would be that Kenyan voters are inclined to disregard ethnic belonging as a 
parameter in electoral behaviour if their elected politicians actually deliver positive 
economic or social developments that benefit the whole community. 
5.4.3 Party leaders 
In recent years there has been a tendency to vote on the basis of the party leader they 
prefer rather than for the party they think has the best policies or will best represent 
their interests (Curtice and Holmberg 2005:235). Some scholars (Scarrow et al. 2000) 
argue that party leaders have become increasingly powerful within their own parties. 
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Leaders have in a sense begun to shape their parties in their own image. As a result the 
leader’s policy becomes the party’s policy, in an environment where a competent 
leader creates the impression of a competent party. Given the complexity of policy-
making, voters may find it difficult to sort out whether the government is to blame for 
the state of the economy and which party has the best policy. Instead, their voting is 
influenced by the party leader they like best, whom they can trust or whom they need 
to be suspicious of (Curtice and Holmberg 2005:236). 
 
The findings in European electoral research indicate, however, that the party leaders’ 
influence on voting behaviour is limited. The strongest evidence that leaders do matter 
is where a parliamentary election comes close to mimicking a presidential contest 
(Curtice and Holmberg 2005:252). My findings suggest a whole different diagnosis of 
the Kenyan political reality. People seem to be voting for persons rather than parties, 
regardless of the underlying rationale being based on ethnic identity or on what the 
candidate stands for ideologically or on specific issues.  
 
The party structure is weak in Kenya. Political alliances change frequently from one 
election to the next and new parties dissolve and emerge with high frequency. Politics 
is dominated, however, by the same political leaders and strongmen continuously yet 
in different guises, in the different alliances and in different parties. Feedback from 
respondents indicates that this is a reality the voters are very aware of. When talking 
about different policies within the different parties, this is the kind of answer 16 out of 
20 respondents gave: 
 
“Political parties do not have policies. It is about the sincerity of the 
individual leader, the capacity of the candidates” 
- Luo man, 34 years, Korogocho 
 
As mentioned under section 5.3 (Ideology), it seems to be leaders and individual 
personalities in the parties, not the parties themselves, that represent and articulate the 
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respective political agendas. The various politicians do principally represent the same 
political line regardless of what party or alliance they are currently in. But at the same 
time, they also represent their ethnic group. When a new political alliance is created, it 
seems to be of crucial importance that all the major ethnic groups are represented in 
the leadership. Chapter 2 gave examples of this, especially in the run-up to the 2002 
election (section 2.4.1). To have representatives of the different ethnic groups in the 
leadership has also been important in the two major alliances now ruling the country – 
the ODM and the PNU.   
 
Party leaders and individuals within alliances are definitely important. It is hard, 
however, to determine whether they are important due to ethnic affiliation or their 
individual ideological beliefs. In accordance with previous presented findings, I would 
say both. 
5.4.4 Vote buying 
Another short-term strategy used in developing countries is to invest resources in 
building up credibility among voters directly through vote-buying (Keefer 2007:806). 
The practice of vote-buying appears in many societies and organisations, and in 
different forms. Obvious examples include direct payments to voters, the buying of 
voting cards and the promise of specific programmes or payments to voters conditional 
on the election of a candidate (Dekel et al. 2008:2). 
 
All of my interviewees and everybody I had informal discussions with on the topic 
stated that it is very normal for the different parties and candidates to give out money 
in their election campaigns, and that this usually happens at political meetings and 
rallies. Most of my respondents, 16 out of 20, had personally been offered money, and 
some of them had taken what was given. Nevertheless, they all said it had little 
influence on their voting, as the parties no longer had any possibility to monitor who 
an individual is voting for. Further, the amount of money normally given on such 
occasions is very small (KES 50 or about NOK 5). Consequently, people who receive 
money do not really feel guilty for taking it even though they are not voting for the 
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party in question. It was explained to me that in earlier times it was possible to buy an 
individual’s voting card and that this probably had a certain effect on the outcome of 
the election. This is not a common practice any more, and people did not think that 
vote-buying really made any difference on the outcome of an election. The common 
understanding was that people took money from anybody, but in the end chose their 
preferred candidate. This quote is representative of a majority of my respondents: 
 
“It is very normal for MPs or other politicians to give out money before an 
election. I have been offered many times. Normally I take the money, but I 
vote for the candidate I trust most. This vote buying doesn’t work” 
     - Kikuyu man, 51 years old, Uasin Gishu  
 
My findings with regard to vote-buying in Kenya are unambiguous, and provide a 
basis for a concluding that it has very little impact on voting behaviour. It must be 
added, however, that it is not possible, based on any amount of interviews, to dismiss 
altogether the possibility that money might be a decisive factor in individual cases; for 
example, when an individual does not have a clear opinion or any clear preferences as 
to whom he or she should be voting for. 
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Chapter 6 – Major findings and conclusion 
 
Ever since the reintroduction of multi-party elections in 1992, Kenya has been riddled 
with electoral violence with seemingly strong ethnic undercurrents. For the outside 
observer it might seem as if ethnic tensions within the Kenyan society are at an 
alarming level. The immediate perception could perhaps be that politics and elections 
in this context are merely a matter of ethnic power struggles in which the individual 
voters’ electoral choices are more or less given by their ethnic affiliation. But is this 
really the case? The purpose of this thesis has been to explain why Kenyans appear to 
vote ethnically and to explore the possible relationship between ethnic identities and 
policy interests. What is really the rationale underlying the act of voting, what do 
Kenyans emphasise when they head for the ballot box? 
 
My preliminary hypothesis was that Kenyans vote ethnically mainly because they 
believe it will benefit their economic interests. And that ethnicity acts as an 
intermediate variable or an epiphenomenon that in many cases serves as a means to an 
end. 
 
Since it is impossible to explore all the relevant variables effecting Kenyans voting 
behaviour, my research was based on a selection of different electoral theories 
supplemented with theories of ethnicity.  
 
In chapter 2 I described the political developments leading up to independence and the 
demographics surrounding the settlement schemes which are so critical to 
understanding Kenyan voting behaviour. Ethnic ties and identities were shown to have 
been exploited and politicised by the political elites with regard to national issues such 
as access to land and deregulation of state power, leading, in turn, to increased ethnic 
divisions within the Kenyan population that become particularly visible around 
national elections. 
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To explore the assumption that ethnicity and economic interests correlate in Kenyan 
voting behaviour I needed a theoretical framework to engage with both electoral 
behaviour and ethno-politics. Thus, in chapter 3 I first presented different theories of 
rational electoral behaviour and then different theories of ethnicity and ethno-politics. I 
also discussed the role of political institutions and political entrepreneurs in 
politicising ethnic identity, and finally I tried to connect ethnic affiliation with the 
other political motivations determining electoral behaviour.  
 
In Chapter 4 I presented the methodological approach, and in Chapter 5 I analysed the 
interplay between ethnicity and rational socio-economic voting behaviour. The chapter 
was organised around the theoretical perspectives presented in chapter 3. I tried to 
differentiate between ethnic ties as reasons for voting behaviour and the different 
rationales put forward by distinctive electoral choice theories.  
 
In this concluding chapter I will go through the major findings and ultimately draw 
conclusions from these and present elements and perspectives with relevance for 
further research. 
 
6.1 Major findings  
I went through some of the most common theories of electoral behaviour in chapter 
three and considered their significance to Kenya in chapter four. I will rapidly go 
through the elements I found to be influential on Kenyan voting behaviour and those 
that were not, before I will take a closer look at my major findings. 
 
Kenyan society and its political environment have developed in a way that has left 
little room or relevance for the social cleavages of class and religion, and these have 
thus not been reflected in the formation of the party system. There is no significant 
party in Kenya today that could be perceived as representing a certain class or religion 
more than other parties. The only social cleavage of political significance in Kenyan 
society is ethnicity. 
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Reviewing the long-term predispositions I found evidence that although party 
identification might have been important previously, it is today not a significant 
determining factor of electoral behaviour in Kenya. Clientelist networks do exist in 
Kenya, but my research is inconclusive as to the degree it affects electoral behaviour; 
detailed research is needed to draw any firm conclusion. 
 
I would argue, however, that I found evidence that economic ideology and economic 
value orientations play a role in determining electoral behaviour in Kenya. This might 
still be hard to detect at times from just looking at electoral results. As historical 
injustices and perceptions of marginalisation have been strengthened among certain 
ethnic groups, ideology, economic values and ethnicity are reinforcing each other and 
leading to similar voting patterns.  
 
When reviewing the short-term factors, my research further reveals that vote-buying 
is of little importance for electoral behaviour of Kenyans. Vote-buying is still a 
common practice at political meetings and rallies during election campaigns. 
Nevertheless, all my respondents stated that it had little significance for their actions as 
voters. 
 
Retrospective voting, party leaders and political issues, on the other hand, seem to be 
important in determining Kenyan electoral behaviour. With regard to the prevalence of 
retrospective voting and ethnicity I found something interesting in Korogocho. My 
research indicates that Kenyans are inclined to disregard ethnicity as a significant 
parameter if their elected politicians actually deliver tangible results. Voting based on 
ethnic loyalties might be a sort of disillusioned last resort for many voters. 
 
Party leaders and individuals are definitely very important in Kenya. It is, however, 
hard to determine if the leaders are important through the strength of their ethnic 
representation or their individual ideological beliefs.  
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Land reform and constitutional reform have been important issues throughout Kenya’s 
post-independence history. Particularly majimboism or devolution of power has been a 
contagious political issue around elections, influencing Kenyan electoral behaviour. 
The issue of majimboism is either linked to ethnic cleansing or associated with the 
political value of economic equality and a leftist ideological leaning. This re-
emphasises the intertwining of ethnicity and economic ideology in Kenyan politics. 
 
6.2 Conclusion  
The background for my thesis is in a broad sense my interest for Kenyan people and 
politics. More specifically it arose from the accounts of the post-election events in the 
international media in 2007/08. The image portrayed of a Kenyan population driven 
exclusively by ethnic grudges and loyalties did not correspond with my own past 
experience from working and living in the country. Although ethnicity is important for 
Kenyan electoral behaviour, it is by no means the only significant marker in Kenyan 
politics. I suspected that ethnicity serves more as an intermediate variable, influencing 
the underlying rationales for electoral behaviour, which are mostly economic 
variables. The basis of my thesis was, thus, the following preliminary hypothesis: 
Kenyan voting patterns overwhelmingly follow ethnic cleavages mainly because the 
voters believe their electoral choices will somehow benefit their economic interests, 
either as individuals or as communities.  
 
My older respondents gave relatively blunt statements that directly supported this 
hypothesis. They vote ethnically primarily because they believe it will bring them 
economic benefits of some sort. The responses and statements of the remaining 
respondents were less uniform; some respondents stated that they had in fact not voted 
in accordance with their ethnic identity at all.  
 
The younger respondents who confirm that they vote in accordance with their ethnic 
identity state other political reasons for their electoral choices. Analysing these 
responses, some rationales and theories of electoral behaviour are distinctly more 
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relevant than others. This is true for (i) ideology; (ii) economic values; (iii) issues; and 
(iv) retrospective voting, in particular. But reviewing this analysis, economic interests, 
especially at the community level, emerge as a common denominator across the board. 
The struggle for the control and distribution of resources through the state apparatus is 
fundamental for all these rationales, not just in the form of simplistic assumptions 
about reaping benefits through more or less corrupt preferential treatment, but also in 
the sense that political issues and dispute over the allocation and distribution of 
resources become significant for electoral choices. And, the political divisions related 
to these highlighted issues correlates well with the country’s main ethnic divisions. It 
is my argument that this is what ultimately gives ethnicity its vital significance in the 
dynamics of Kenyan power politics and electoral behaviour.  
 
Voters who have not been voting in accordance with their ethnic identities also give 
economic or ideological-economic reasons for their electoral behaviour. Two clear 
examples stand out; the Kalenjin from Uasin Gishu quoted in section 4.3.3, who cited 
ideology as a determining factor; and the young segment of respondents from 
Korogocho, regardless of ethnic affiliation, who all had voted for the new female Luo 
MP because they believed it would benefit their ethnically heterogeneous local 
community, rather than their narrow ethnic community.  
 
If what my research suggests is indeed correct, the Kenyan population would 
seemingly be willing to put ethnic candidate preferences aside if they saw tangible 
results from their elected representatives, regardless of ethnicity. If these signals were, 
in turn, translated into political action by Kenyan politicians, through determination to 
deliver political action matching their electoral promises, they would perhaps in the 
process make a strong contribution to reducing ethnic tension and discord.  
 
My research has indicated a voting pattern where ideological cleavages linked to 
economic policies coincide with ethnic cleavages. Adamantly concluding on the basis 
of the responses I got from my interviewees would not be justified. More data is 
required, as the respondents put forward differing reasons and rationales to explain this 
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de facto ethnic voting pattern. Nevertheless, I would argue that my findings give clear 
indications of ethnicity acting as an epiphenomenon.  
 
The contours of a significant correlation between political cleavages and ethnicity 
have been made visible through my research and analysis. A considerable prevalence 
of relatively strong perceptions of marginalisation has been uncovered, owing largely 
to colonial injustices regarding distribution of land, and their reinforcement after 
independence. Voters from ethnic communities that share such perceptions of 
marginalisation state very clearly that issues pointing back to economic interests are 
decisive motivations for their electoral choices. Conversely, the motivations of voters 
representing ethnic communities perceived to have benefited from the unfair post-
independent policies mirror those of their adversaries, especially with regard to private 
ownership and redistributionist policies. These conclusions are in line with Andreassen 
et al. (2008:65) who point out that ethnic loyalties act as a proxy for political cleavages 
of a different nature. They conclude that “Kenyan politics is of a dual nature: political 
cleavages other than ethnicity have emerged but interact to confirm the persistence of 
political ethnicity” (ibid).  
 
End note 
For Kenyan politics to move out of the valley of the shadow of ethnic discord, this 
correlation will have to be unveiled and addressed. The Kenyan contemporary reality 
is that even though the prevalent perception of marginalisation may have roots in 
historical facts, the class differences or differences in economic well-being within each 
ethnic group is by any scale much bigger than those between ethnic groups. 
Unleashing the potential political momentum of an alliance based on such common 
socio-economic realities and interests would undoubtedly create new dynamics in 
Kenyan politics, but such a scenario does not seem likely in the near future as Kenya’s 
political and economic elite appears to master the politics of ethnicity skilfully.  
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List of Interviews 
 
The interviews were conducted in August and September 2008, in Korogocho, Nairobi 
and Uasin Gishu district.  
 
Aug 26: Pax Washika, Korogocho 
Aug 27: Anne Nyaguthii Washira, Korogocho 
Aug 29: Khamis Ramadhan, Korogocho 
Aug 29: Abdi Hussein, Korogocho 
Aug 31: Nancy Wangari, Korogocho 
Sept 15: Francis K. Kamau, Uasin Gishu 
Sept 15: Mary Ndugu, Uasin Gishu 
Sept 15: Jackson Mwangi, Uasin Gishu 
Sept 15: Unice Chipchirchir Nyakundi, Uasin Gishu 
Sept 16: James Arap Tirof, Uasin Gishu 
Sept 16: Leonita Nteny, Uasin Gishu 
Sept: 16: Simon Kuria Gitau, Uasin Gishu 
Sept 17: Nicolas Musiuka, Uasin Gishu 
Sept 17: William Kipkorir Tuei, Uasin Gishu 
Sept 17: Mary Mwangi, Uasin Gishu 
Sept 23: Martin Owala, Korogocho 
Sept 23: Mbune Kinuthie, Korogocho 
Sept 24: Tom Mboya, Korogocho 
Sept 24: Mary Atieno, Korogocho 
Sept 25: Perres Amati, Korogocho 
 
Members of the focal group discussion on September 18, Uasin Gishu: 
Lucy Mwei, Nelly Koech, Bejamin K. Talam, Patrick W. Mwangi, Simon Ngige 
Mungai, Samuel Mwangi Kamau and Joseph Chumba. 
 
